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[263] 
Community Economic Development Strategies in the 
New Millennium: Key Advantages of Community 






Over the past few decades, social, political, and economic 
transformations have underscored the paradox of steadily increasing 
globalization amid a renewed isolationist backlash in various Western 
societies.  Populist and nativist political parties and elected leaders have risen 
in lockstep with wealth and income inequality in those same countries as well 
as concomitant and rapidly shifting social norms—all have been identified as 
prominent influences over contemporary life.  Within these upheavals, 
various political, cultural, and economic actors have ascended the ranks of 
the world’s most powerful institutions, spreading their global reach to 
billions. 
This phenomenon is seen on the local level as well.  Particularly, the 
roles of cities have garnered great interest with a renewed popular focus 
which extends far beyond the typical, niche communities of urbanists, 
planners, designers, academics, and local organizers of generations past.  
Today’s cities exemplify the aforementioned paradox of modernity in a 
microcosm, with endemic conflicts and challenges starkly reflected at street 
level.  Cities at once represent the gravest examples of post-recession 
economic fallout and stubbornly inadequate recovery, while also providing 
varied models for the strongest economic recoveries since global financial 
and housing markets began their dramatic collapse over a decade ago.  As 
they have proven resilient incubators for innovation and entrepreneurship, 
cities also offer many warning signs for how management and policy choices 
may constrain or wholly impose barriers upon the upward mobility of urban 
residents.  In the present-day United States, some cities are emblematic of 
 
 2019 J.D. Candidate at the University of California, Hastings College of the Law, San Francisco, 
Calif.  The author would like to extend his gratitude to Professor James Head and many colleagues 
in the Spring 2018 Community Economic Development Seminar at U.C. Hastings for their guidance 
in developing initial research ideas.  Additional thanks are owed to the staff at Hastings Race and 
Poverty Law Journal and to Matthew Lawrence, whose careful edits and detailed suggestions were 
invaluable. 
7 - HRPLJ_16-2_CARR (MACROS).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/2/2019  3:15 PM 
264 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVI 
progressive, localized policy experimentation in the face of unforgiving 
federal austerity, while others are as polarized and gridlocked as American 
national politics.  In short, cities are both increasingly realized engines of 
national and even global economic growth as much as deserving targets for 
critique. 
The extreme disparity of experience among major American cities since 
the financial crisis and Great Recession—between the powerhouse “elite” 
cities which have experienced rapid growth in the last decade on one hand, 
and still-struggling, economically disadvantaged postindustrial urban centers 
on the other—highlights the varied challenges facing today’s urban leaders 
globally.  Cities experiencing continued, sometimes significantly worsening 
economic stagnation or deterioration have less and less financial security as 
their populations decrease, tax bases shrink, and longstanding debts or 
financing obligations come due—pension plans for city employees, debt 
repayments for decades-old public projects, and many others.  For 
“successful” post-recession American cities, record-setting job growth and 
seemingly ever-deeper venture capital pockets recall their earlier booms.  The 
latest euphoria, of course, comes with critical caveats: accelerating housing 
shortages, ultra-competitive labor markets, and cost-prohibitive or altogether 
nonexistent physical space for new construction can fuel segregation and 
waves of displacement.  Among members of this “successful” group, like 
New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Washington, DC, the cruel irony 
is that their resurgent economic growth imposes dire externalities on the most 
vulnerable members of their communities.  The returns generated by recent 
growth, apparent in national or global comparative analyses, remain wildly 
concentrated among these “successes.”  As community development 
organizations and leaders grapple with the previous decade’s crises and 
lingering consequences, then, a stocktaking of strategies for extracting and 
distributing the benefits of renewed growth is needed. 
This paper provides such an assessment, relying upon lessons drawn 
from recent case studies to elaborate a simple, updated framework for both 
researchers and practitioners.  It also seeks to harmonize and extend research 
on community economic development (CED), especially where it engages 
issues of urbanization, economic consolidation, and gaping inequalities.  
Ultimately, concentrations of capital and talent in major cities entail 
significant risks to extant low-income residents.  Such massive influxes of 
capital for marquee mega-projects—a form of urban development common 
in the largest American cities and the primary focus of this paper—
nonetheless may offer limited opportunities to the CED movement.  Finally, 
evaluating the novel activist strategies around mega-projects, along with their 
successes and failures compared to existing models, such as community 
benefits agreements (“CBAs”), could offer practicable lessons as well. 
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II.  Historical Urbanism, the Community Economic Development 
Movement and CED Aims  
 
Historical Trends in United States Urban Development 
 
After a half-century of suburbanization and demographic decline in 
major American cities,1 the first years of the twenty-first century signaled a 
partial reversal of those trends.2  Since the middle of the twentieth century, 
three generalized patterns have marked urban demographic shifts in major 
United States cities.  First, the sustained growth of the “Sunbelt” cities of the 
south and southwest.  Second, the persistent population losses and economic 
stagnation experienced by a number of cities largely concentrated in the 
“Rustbelt” of the midwest and interior northeast.  Finally, the explosive 
economic and record-breaking population growth occurring in several 
notable, older coastal urban centers, the so-called “coastal elites.”  While 
many challenges truly are felt by cities universally, the generalized 
urbanization patterns highlighted herein must be kept analytically distinct 
because of the different constraints they place upon local activists.  For 
community leaders in the coastal elites, the muted downturns of the late 
twentieth century combined with the roaring economic conditions since the 
Great Recession impose singularly extreme concerns.  Among the most 
serious worries are rapidly the escalating cost of living, stretched or entirely 
dysfunctional city services, from transportation to public education, and the 
auctioning of limited space to the wealthiest interests. 
On balance, it appears many of America’s major cities are “back,” if 
unevenly so.  The first task is to make sense of them cogently and 
systematically, to generalize from these regional and economic “types” 
certain common features and current challenges without losing sight of each 
city’s individuality. 
 
1. Sunbelt Cities: Success, Sprawl, Volatility, Risk 
 
Sunbelt cities are those in the southern and southwestern United States, 
 
1.  See, e.g., Desmond King & Ted Gurr, Federal Responses to Urban Fiscal Stress and 
Decline in the United States, 17 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 109 (1987); Ray Northam, Declining Urban 
Centers in the United States: 1940-1960, 53 ANNALS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN 
GEOGRAPHERS 50 (1963); Gregory Squires, Ruthanne Dewolfe, & Alan Dewolfe, Urban Decline 
or Disinvestment: Uneven Development, Redlining, and the Role of the Insurance Industry, 27 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 79 (1979).  For an overview discussion of endogenous interactions between 
urbanization/development and climate change in a global context, see Matthew E. Kahn, Urban 
Growth and Climate Change, 1 ANN. REV. RESOURCE ECON. 333 (2009).  
2.  See discussion in Part II (B), infra.  See generally, Leah Boustan & Allison Shertzer, 
Population Trends as a Counterweight to Central City Decline, 1950-2000, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 125 
(2013).  
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stretching from Los Angeles and San Diego in Southern California across the 
desert Southwest, Texas, the Gulf States to Florida and the Southeast.3 These 
cities continue to contain some of the fastest-growing Census jurisdictions 
nationwide.4  This is a sustained pattern which began in the 1930s,5 continued 
through the 1960s, and accelerated from the 1970s to the present.6  Between 
2015 and 2016, ten of the country’s fifteen fastest-growing cities were in the 
loosely geographically defined Sunbelt, and four of the top five were in Texas 
alone.7 
Research suggests that there are various drivers of the longstanding 
urban population growth across the Sunbelt.  Expanded “oil and natural 
resource exploration” in the south and west followed the energy crisis of the 
1970s, with workers following highly paid jobs into the heartland and Gulf 
Coast regions.8  For instance, Houston, among other cities, came into global 
prominence as a major center for the oil and gas industries.9  More broadly, 
the post-industrial, decentralizing economic transformations of the latter half 
of the twentieth century touched industries far beyond oil and gas,10 with 
cross-industry “brain drains” pulling educated talent from the older cities of 
the Northeast and Midwest into the Sunbelt regions.11 
Government policies reinforced and expanded these trends as well.  The 
formation of the federal interstate highway system, various tax and regulatory 
incentives promoting homeownership, and increasing local, state, and federal 
government spending on suburban and exurban development projects and 
 
3.  See SUNBELT CITIES: POLITICS AND GROWTH SINCE WORLD WAR II (Richard M. Bernard 
& Bradley R. Rice, eds., 1983) (surveying major cities in the Sunbelt region, also including 
Albuquerque, New Mexico, Atlanta, Georgia, Dallas-Fort Worth, Texas, Miami, Florida, New 
Orleans, Louisiana, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, and Phoenix, Arizona, all of which benefited from 
both shifting social and political preferences as well as federal government policies from the middle 
of the twentieth century onward).  
4.  See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE SOUTH IS HOME TO 10 OF THE 15 FASTEST-GROWING 
LARGE CITIES, Press Release CB17-81 (May 25, 2017), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-
releases/2017/cb17-81-population-estimates-subcounty.html.  Accord U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, FIVE 
OF THE NATION’S ELEVEN FASTEST-GROWING CITIES ARE IN TEXAS, Press Release CB16-81 (May 
19, 2016), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/press-releases/2016/cb16-81.html (noting the same 
five Texan cities were among the fastest-growing cities with populations over 50,000 the year prior, 
between 2016 and 2016).  
5.  Richard Lloyd, Urbanization and the Southern United States, 38 ANN. REV. SOC. 483 
(2012). 
6.  William H. Frey & Alden Speare, Jr., The Revival of Metropolitan Population Growth in 
the United States: An Assessment of Findings from the 1990 Census, 18 POPULATION & DEV. REV. 
129 (1992).  
7.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TEXAS, supra note 4. 
8.  Frey & Alden, supra note 6, at 130.  
9.  See Joe R. Feagin, The Global Context of Metropolitan Growth: Houston and the Oil 
Industry, 90 AM. J. SOC. 1204 (1985).  
10.  Frey & Alden, supra note 6, at 130. 
11.  Lloyd, supra note 5, at 483–84.  
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infrastructure all were hallmarks of twentieth century American urban 
policymaking.12 
New highway construction during the midcentury economic boom—
roughly from the 1940s onward, overlapping with major cities’ marked 
demographic declines—proved to be influential in two ways.  First, the 
expansion of urban highways, e.g., new interstates or “spurs” from existing 
highways through central city neighborhoods, “contributed markedly to this 
central city population decline.”13  In part, the impact of highways may be 
explained by a “land use theory” in which “faster commuting times [in new 
suburbs with highway access] push up demand for space in suburbs relative 
to central cities.”14  The interactive effects of those pull factors in the outskirts 
vis-à-vis the push factors in urban cores were also substantial. Among them 
are the conscious production of “amenity value” in the suburbs, the 
confluence of self-selected racial segregation with redlining15 and related 
actions by government or banking sector actors sanctioning private-sector 
discrimination, increasing crime rates in urban centers, and desegregation of 
city schools after the 1950s.16  As truck transportation of goods became the 
norm nationwide, moreover, the “decentralization of residential activity was 
followed by employment decentralization.”17  A “self-reinforcing” process 
developed where both employers and their employees increasingly followed 
one another farther away from traditional urban cores.18  One empirical 
estimate found that, “had the interstate system not been built, instead of 
 
12.  Lloyd, supra note 5, at 487. 
13.  Nathanial Baum-Snow, Did Highways Cause Suburbanization?, 122 Q. J. ECON. 775 
(2007).  
14.  Id.  Accord Peter Mieszkowski & Edwin S. Mills, The Causes of Metropolitan 
Suburbanization, 7 J. ECON. PERSP. 135 (1993); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local 
Expenditure, 54 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956). 
15.  See, e.g., John M. Stahura, Determinants of Change in the Distribution of Blacks across 
Suburbs, 24 SOC. Q. 421, 422 (1983) (“Black suburban expansion tends to follow administrative 
boundaries.  As a black suburban community grows, it moves into adjacent residential areas within 
the same suburb, rather than into other suburbs, because of the difficulties encountered with 
‘exclusionary’ zoning and dual housing markets . . .  In other words, some suburbs have become 
defined as environmentally undesirable, and it is into these areas that blacks are ‘steered’ or 
‘contained’ by a variety of agencies, including subdivision developers, realtors, individual sellers, 
lending institutions, and local and federal government . . .  ‘Redlined’ areas are those areas for which 
lending institutions provide little financial backing in terms of mortgages or home improvement 
loans because of the assumed risk related to the housing stock and/or racial composition of the 
area.”) 
16.  See, e.g., Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the 
Consequences for Cities, 81 REV. ECON. & STATS. 159 (1999); Daniel T. Lichter & Glenn V. 
Fuguitt, Demographic Response to Transportation Innovation: The Case of the Interstate Highway, 
59 SOCIAL FORCES 492 (1980); Carol A. O’Connor, Sorting Out the Suburbs: Patterns of Land Use, 
Class, and Culture, 37 AM. Q. 382 (1985); Sarah Reber, Court-Ordered Desegregation: Successes 
and Failures in Integration since Brown vs. Board of Education, 40 J. HUM. RES. 259 (2005). 
17.  Mieszkowski & Mills, supra note 14, at 136. 
18.  Id.  
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declining by 17 percent, aggregate central city population would have grown 
by 8 percent” from 1950 to 1990.19 
As economic forces and affirmative government policy choices fostered 
rapid growth across the Sunbelt—and the concomitant downfall of traditional 
urban cores around the country—global investment followed.  The diffusion 
of foreign investment in the United States, from earlier concentrations in New 
York City and the Northeast during the 1970s to broader distributions of 
investing across the south and west through the early 1980s,20 reinforced the 
same developmental and economic patterns.  Between 1979 and 1983, for 
example, foreign investment rates in service sector economies skewed 
increasingly toward the Sunbelt: southern and western cities comprised eight 
of the top 10 metropolitan areas receiving such investment during the period, 
with only New York and Chicago among non-Sunbelt major cities making 
the list, second and eighth respectively.21  The “deconcentration” of foreign 
investment and foreign labor across America’s metropolitan regions 
continues at present—2016’s list of leading metropolitan areas receiving 
foreign capital investment closely tracks with the leading cities from 1979 to 
1983.22  Notable variation exists as smaller southern metropolitan regions, 
like Richmond, Virginia, have become favored destinations for inbound 
global capital.23  Thus, deconcentration and its effects across the Sunbelt are 
felt on two levels: the general shift of global capital toward the Sunbelt cities 
over the past four decades and the concomitant dispersion of that capital 
among a broader cross-section of the region’s cities since the turn of the 
twenty-first century. 
No matter how consistent they appear, the economic and financial trends 
among Sunbelt cities—ever upward and outward—are peppered with 
evidence of extreme volatility.  Indelible to the spectacular growth rates are 
increasingly clear ecological and climatological effects of climate change24 
 
19.  Baum-Snow, supra note 13, at 776 (emphasis added). 
20.  See, e.g., Sharmistha Bagchi-Sen & James O. Wheeler, A Spatial and Temporal Model of 
Foreign Direct Investment in the United States, 65 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 113 (1989).  
21.  Id. at 116.  
22.  Devashree Saha, Kenan Fikri, & Nick Marchio, FDI in U.S. Metro Areas: The Geography 
of Jobs in Foreign-Owned Establishments, 14 BROOKINGS-JPMORGAN CHASE (June 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/MetroFDI.pdf.  
23.  Richmond Named Top U.S. City for Foreign Direct Investment, GREATER RICHMOND 
P’SHIP (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.grpva.com/newsroom/news/richmond-named-top-u-s-city-
for-foreign-direct-investment/.  
24.  See Lloyd, supra note 5, at 498–99 (describing New Orleans as simultaneously 
“distinctive and beloved” among American cities, yet also “long . . . a city in distress, with all 
industries other than tourism in terminal decline,” high poverty levels and spiraling population 
losses, all of which were exacerbated after the catastrophic landfall of Hurricane Katrina in 2005); 
see generally J.G. Bartlett, D. M. Mageean, & R. J. O’Connor, Residential Expansion as a 
Continental Threat to U.S. Coastal Ecosystems, 21 POP. & ENVIRO. 429, 430–31 (2000) (noting, 
inter alia, the rapid population growth in coastal U.S. communities, which outpaced total national 
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and, like the country overall, pervasive inequalities that come with vast 
suburban sprawl. 
Many of the Sunbelt’s major metropolitan regions began their 
extraordinary growth spurts during the middle of the last century, but the 
story of their expansions often is oversimplified.  Phoenix, Arizona, for 
example, grew at astonishing rates between 1940 and 1980.25  By the 2010 
Census, Phoenix’s population had surged to over 1.45 million and by 2017 
had increased a further 12.4 percent to nearly 1.63 million, the fifth-most-
populous city in the United States.26  While the city’s explosive growth 
signals many of the strengths of the Phoenix urban area—a strong economy 
with successful high-technology and tourism sectors and affordable housing 
and services27—it obscures the consequences of its own success. 
Aside from increased pollution, traffic, and crime, which are all 
ubiquitous consequences of urban growth, Phoenix’s boom has entailed some 
less-obvious, locale-specific costs.  The city’s vast sprawl and summertime 
heat, for instance, have generated a feedback loop, where the asphalt and built 
environment trap and retain daytime heat over longer durations.28  As the 
city’s fringes stretch deeper into the surrounding desert landscapes, this urban 
heat island phenomenon—referring to the countless acres of pavement across 
the low-density region’s suburban shopping districts and office parks, which 
“retain and magnify” the extreme heat of Arizona summers—cumulatively 
“warmed [Phoenix by] at least seven degrees [Celsius]” between 1960 and 
1990.29 
The increasingly intense summer heat has been suggested as underlying 
a sense that there has been a “lack of personal commitment” or social 
 
population growth by approximately three-to-one and, for certain communities and even entire 
states during the 1990s—e.g., Nevada, Arizona, Idaho, and Utah—growth rates which were “faster 
than many developing countries,” all contributing to systemic environmental consequences); Mark 
Crawford, Planning for Climate Change, 242 SCI. 510 (1988) (arguing that, while the effects of 
climate change are widely—indeed, globally—distributed, the Southeastern United States is 
expected to face especially severe effects in the region’s major industries).  
25.  Population grew by “over one thousand percent,” from a population of just over 65,000 
to nearly 800,000 over those four decades alone.  Bradford Luckingham, Trouble in a Sunbelt City, 
33 J. SOUTHWEST 52 (1991).  
26.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS, PHOENIX, ARIZ. (2018), https://www.census.gov/ 
quickfacts/fact/table/phoenixcityarizona/IPE120216.  
27.  Luckingham, supra note 25, at 52–53.  
28.  See, e.g., Richard C. Balling, Jr. & Sandra W. Brazel, Time and Space Characteristics of 
the Phoenix Urban Heat Island, 21 J. ARIZ.-NEV. ACAD. SCI. 75 (1987) (reporting a 3.9 degree 
(Fahrenheit) increase in nighttime maximum temperatures in parts of the Phoenix area between 
1970 and the mid-1980s alone).  Accord Brent C. Hedquist & Anthony J. Brazel, Urban, Residential, 
and Rural Climate Comparisons from Mobile Transects and Fixed Stations: Phoenix, Arizona, 38 
J. ARIZ.-NEV. ACAD. SCI. 77, 85 (2006) (reporting a maximum temperature variance between 
urban-Phoenix and rural outlying areas’ measures of up to 11 degrees Celsius during the summer of 
2001).  
29.  Luckingham, supra note 25, at 53–54.  
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connection among the city’s many newcomers from the latter half of the 
twentieth century to today.30  Social “isolation,” especially during peak 
summer months from May to September, is a result of the design of the city’s 
sprawling housing developments.  “Detached single-family homes [remain] 
the ideal.”31  Commutes are almost always solo trips from home to the office 
and back, in a necessarily air conditioned vehicle.32  Common design 
elements, such as the use of cement-block privacy walls to separate the yards 
of many suburban tract homes, create barriers to interaction.33  These factors 
all reinforce social isolation. 
Among other demographic consequences, Phoenix’s residents 
historically have moved frequently to new homes and jumped between 
apartments, with a near-majority of renters moving as often as every year.34  
Commercial tenants in the city’s many shopping centers turned over quickly, 
as new developments and shifting residential population centers constantly 
evolved.35  Most starkly, “for every three people who moved to Phoenix 
[during the height of its boom in the 1970s and 1980s], two left.”36  Phoenix, 
in short, reflects the trade-offs of the “counterurbanization” model in many 
Sunbelt metropolises37—as well as the developmental, planning, and 
environmental challenges they all will face ahead. 
 
2. Rustbelt Cities: Longstanding Challenges, Creativity and Tenacity 
 
In contrast to the breakneck expansions of many Sunbelt urban areas, a 
handful of Rustbelt cities—generally defined as the post-industrial urban 
areas of the interior northeast and American Midwest, e.g., Chicago,38 
Milwaukee,39 Pittsburgh,40 and, most notably, Detroit41—either have 
 
30.  Luckingham, supra note 25, at 53.  
31.  Id. at 54. 
32.  Id.  
33.  Id.  
34.  Id. at 54–55. 
35.  Id.  
36.  Id. at 53.  
37.  Brian J.L. Berry, Urbanization and Counterurbanization in the United States, 451 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 13 (1980).  
38.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS, CHICAGO, ILL. (2018), https://www.census.gov/ 
quickfacts/fact/table/chicagocityillinois/PST045216 (estimated 0.3% growth between 2010 and 
July 2016).  
39.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS, MILWAUKEE, WISC. (2018), https://www.census. 
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/milwaukeecitywisconsin/PST045217 (near-zero population change from 
2010 through July 2017).  
40.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS, PITTSBURGH, PENN. (2018), https://www.census. 
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/pittsburghcitypennsylvania/PST045216 (estimated 0.7% population loss 
from 2010 through July 2016).  
41.  Detroit experienced an astonishing 6.9% population decline from 1990 through 2000, U.S. 
CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 2010, 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 
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remained largely stagnant or have endured persistent, deep population 
declines into the new millennium.  Rustbelt urban demographic and 
economic declines are further compounded by other challenges facing racial 
and ethnic minorities residing in these same communities.  Disproportionate 
use of predatory lending practices, consistently poorly vetted subprime 
mortgage lending, and highly concentrated foreclosures in black and 
Hispanic/Latino neighborhoods across these regions deepened the impact of 
the 2007-2009 crisis and subsequent Great Recession.42  Those intertwined 
crises affected the same urban populations, which, despite decreasing 
aggregate poverty rates from the 1960s through the 1980s, had remained well 
above rates for white Americans.  Approximately one-third of black 
Americans fell below the poverty rate in the late 1960s,43 compared to fewer 
than one in eight white Americans, figures which remained nearly static44 
until the Great Recession, after which the national white poverty rate jumped 
to 11.6 percent.45  For Hispanic and Latino Americans, meanwhile, the 
 
9 (Mar. 2011), https://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-01.pdf; from 2010 through 
July 1, 2016, Detroit further lost an estimated 5.8% of its population—off nearly 1.2 million from 
its all-time-high population of 1.85 million in 1950.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS, 
DETROIT, MICH. (2018), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/detroitcitymichigan/PST0 
45216.  Detroit’s systemic issues exemplify the myriad planning, financing, and economic 
challenges of postindustrial urban areas in industrialized societies, with slow-motion financing 
crises—for all segments of the City’s government-funded programs, from health and public safety 
to public schools and basic infrastructure—as well as how they can accelerate dramatically in the 
face of unrelenting population decline.  See, e.g., Evan Bursey & David Wessel, Lessons Learned 
from Detroit: A Judge’s Perspective, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: CITIES & REGIONS (July 20, 2016), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/07/20/lessons-learned-from-detroit-a-judges-pers 
pective/; Bruce Katz & Jennifer Bradley, A Growth Strategy for Post-Bankruptcy Detroit, 
BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: CITIES & REGIONS (July 19, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
opinions/a-growth-strategy-for-post-bankruptcy-detroit/ (arguing that resolving Detroit’s fiscal 
crises—even if achieved, a tall order—will not offer a panacea for resolving continuing decline, but 
that there is room for optimism in the “market momentum” of its downtown revival).  
42.  Matthew Hall, Kyle Crowder, & Amy Spring, Neighborhood Foreclosures, Racial/Ethnic 
Tensions, and Residential Segregation, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 543–44 (2015).  
43.  As of 2017, the U.S. Census Bureau defined the poverty line for a family of four with two 
dependent children as a household with an annual income under $24,858.  DATA: POVERTY 
THRESHOLDS BY SIZE OF FAMILY AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN (2017), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 
(2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/income-poverty/historical-poverty-
thresholds.html.  For 1978, the “baseline” year for Census Bureau estimates and analyses, the 
poverty threshold for a family of four with two dependent children was $6,612 ($24,572 in 2018 
dollars).  DATA: POVERTY THRESHOLDS BY SIZE OF FAMILY AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN (1978 
BASE), U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/ 
income-poverty/historical-poverty-thresholds.html.  
44.  Paul E. Peterson, The Urban Underclass and the Poverty Paradox, 106 POL. SCI. Q. 617, 
619–20 (1991).  
45.  Suzanne Macartney, Alemayehu Bishaw, & Kayla Fontenot, Poverty Rates for Selected 
Detailed Race and Hispanic Groups by State and Place: 2007-2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AM. 
COMMUNITY SURVEY BRIEFS (Feb. 2013), https://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/acsbr11-
17.pdf.  
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poverty rate actually increased from 28 percent in 1972 to 39 percent in 1987, 
although researchers cautioned that the Census Bureau “broadened its 
definition of Hispanic” between those measures, complicating precise 
comparisons.46  As of 2011, the poverty rate for Americans of any reported 
Hispanic origin was just below 25 percent.47 
Economic and income data for the aforementioned key Rustbelt cities 
affirm these patterns at both the city and the metropolitan-region levels of 
analysis.  In Chicago, some 21.7% of the city’s population lived in poverty 
as of 2015, when the total per capita income was reported as $30,847.48  
Those figures were 28.4% and $20,630 for Milwaukee,49 22.3% and $29,196 
for Pittsburgh,50 and 39.4% and $15,562 for Detroit51 (the latter figure being 
only approximately $3,000 above the poverty threshold for single Americans 
nationwide).52  Over the same period, however, nationwide figures for the 
total poverty rate and for per capita incomes were 12.7 %53 and $57,58954 
respectively. 
Of course, the Rustbelt cities, much like the region’s counterparts across 
the Sunbelt, reflect heterogeneous individual experiences.  The wrenching 
forces of deindustrialization and economic transformation hit most of the 
country’s older urban centers hard during the latter half of the twentieth 
century, and hit the Rustbelt particularly severely.  The outcomes across the 
Rustbelt, however, have diverged, especially in recent years.  Cleveland, 
Ohio, pilloried as the “mistake on the lake” four decades ago, began 
 
46.  Peterson, supra note 44, at 620.  
47.  Macartney et al., supra note 45, at 1–2.  
48.  CENSUS: CHICAGO, supra note 38.  
49.  CENSUS: MILWAUKEE, supra note 39. 
50.  CENSUS: CHICAGO, supra note 38. 
51.  CENSUS: DETROIT, supra note 41. 
52.  See, e.g., HHS POVERTY GUIDELINES FOR 2018, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVICES (2018), https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines.  But see Corey Williams, Census 
Figures Show Drop in Detroit Poverty Rate, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/ 
news/best-states/michigan/articles/2017-09-14/census-figures-show-drop-in-detroit-poverty-rate 
(reporting that, while Detroit retained “the highest [poverty] rate among the nation’s 20 largest 
cities,” the city’s poverty rate nonetheless declined from nearly 40 percent in 2015 to 35.7 percent 
in 2016; the Census Bureau also reported a modest increase in Detroit’s median household income 
over the same period, from just under $26,000 to slightly over $28,000).  
53.  INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2016, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2018), 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2017/demo/p60-259.html.  
54.  GDP PER CAPITA (CURRENT US$): UNITED STATES, WORLD BANK (2018), https:// 
data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD?locations=US.  Note, however, the distinction 
between per capita income (defined as the per-individual share of the country’s total gross domestic 
product) and median household income (defined as the arithmetic midpoint between income 
extremes for all families, reducing outlier effects for very high or very low-income individuals as 
compared to per capita measures).  For present purposes, the distinction—an erstwhile substantial 
concern in many empirical contexts—is less pronounced, as the 2016 median household income 
was reported at $59,039, only slightly higher than the per capita figure given by the World Bank.  
Accord INCOME AND POVERTY, supra note 55.  
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recovering in the 1990s through “the emergence of post-Fordist production 
systems, producer services, and consumer consumption,” i.e., modernizing 
and diversifying the city’s economic base while cultivating a cultural/tourism 
identity rooted in the city’s history.55  Where Cleveland built momentum out 
of the area’s musical and sports historical/cultural icons, Pittsburgh enlisted 
iconic higher education institutions—most notably Carnegie Mellon 
University and the University of Pittsburgh—to build local capacity from the 
bottom-up, through local economic development in neighboring 
communities and through directing research funding into long-term 
employment bases throughout the city.56  Similar efforts to prop up existing 
or nascent employment hubs and cultural amenities, building upon the 
successes of concentrated educational institutions, are playing out across the 
region.  These approaches, as well as the increased attention to regional 
cooperation instead of inter-city competition, signal some promising 
developments after decades of dire news media and scholarly analysis.57 
 
3. American Coastal Elites: The Megalopolis to the Bay Area 
 
Many of America’s largest, oldest urban centers have rebounded only 
 
55.  Barney Warf & Brian Holly, The Rise and Fall and Rise of Cleveland, 551 ANN. AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 208, 209 (1997).  
56.  See, e.g., Robert M. Berdahl, Jared L. Cohon, Ruth J. Simmons, John Sexton, & Leslie 
Cohen Berlowitz, The University and the City, 64 BULLETIN AM. ACAD. ARTS & SCI. 4, 11–12 
(2011).  
57.  See, e.g., Peter Truog, One Key to a Rust Belt Comeback: Job Hubs, CITYLAB (June 25, 
2017), https://www.citylab.com/life/2017/06/one-key-to-a-rust-belt-comeback-job-hubs/530697/ 
(discussing, inter alia, the roles of “job clusters” or “job hubs” being leveraged to diversify the 
economy and retain talent, as well as growing attention to regional, rather than single-city, policy); 
Pete Saunders, Hey, Rust Belt and Sun Belt: Don’t Follow the Coasts, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2018), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petesaunders1/2018/01/10/hey-rust-belt-and-sun-belt-dont-follow-th 
e-coasts/#699b5ffc70e4 (arguing that because the “successes and challenges of coastal cities are the 
exception, not the rule,” the Rustbelt—and Sunbelt—urban areas face distinct challenges which 
require different strategic approaches); accord Mark D. Partridge & M. Rose Olfert, The Winners’ 
Choice: Sustainable Economic Strategies for Successful 21st-century Regions, 33 APPLIED ECON. 
PERSP. & POL’Y 143, 145 (2011) (discussing efforts to promote and institutionalize regionalism and 
regional governance among stagnant or declining regions, and finding encouraging evidence of 
regionalism’s successes); Charles J. Whalen, Consensus Mechanisms and Community Economic 
Development: The Buffalo Experience, 21 J. ECON. ISSUES 763, 765–66 (1987) (highlighting the 
role of the City of Buffalo and Erie County’s “overlapping structures” and concomitant inter-
neighbor competition in economic development, which exacerbated the region’s economic decline 
and near-bankruptcies during and after the 1970s—at least until new efforts toward regional 
cooperation among business leaders and organized labor arose).  Compare Robert G. Chollar, 
Public-Private Partnerships, 37 ANTIOCH REV. 162, 163 (1979) (noting that regionalism and 
collaboration can backfire, as in Montgomery County, Ohio, where social spending there in 1973 
totaled $790 million, but was “disbursed through 490 grants in aid and administered by no less than 
270 separate jurisdictions and organizations . . . a typical pattern in many urban communities” for 
the era) (italics omitted).  
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since the late 1990s.  New York City lost over 800,000 people between 1950 
and 1980, but reached a then-all-time-maximum population of 8,008,278 in 
2000,58 and nearly 8.2 million in the 2010 census.59  Boston grew by an 
estimated 9 percent between 2000 and July 2017, after previously losing over 
200,000 people between 1950 and 1990.60  Philadelphia,61 San Francisco,62 
Seattle,63 and other major cities followed have similar trends. 
New York and San Francisco embody a specific developmental and 
demographic pattern, informally referred to as the “coastal elite” cities 
herein.64  Both are older, major urban centers whose economic influence 
predates the turn of the twentieth century.  Both cities, notwithstanding 
population losses after 1950, recovered and eventually exceeded earlier peak 
 
58.  TOTAL AND FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, NEW YORK CITY, 1790-2000, NEW YORK 
CITY PLANNING DEP’T. (2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/data-maps/ 
nyc-population/historical-population/1790-2000_nyc_total_foreign_birth.pdf.  
59.  NYC2010: RESULTS FROM THE 2010 CENSUS, NEW YORK CITY PLANNING DEP’T. 
(2010), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/planning/download/pdf/data-maps/nyc-population/census20 
10/pgrhc.pdf. 
60.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS, BOSTON CITY, MASS. (2018), https://www.census. 
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/bostoncitymassachusetts#viewtop. 
61.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS, PHILADELPHIA, PENN. (2018), https://www.census. 
gov/quickfacts/fact/table/philadelphiacountypennsylvania/PST045216 (estimated 3.6% growth 
between 2010 and July 2017).  
62.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, QUICKFACTS, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF. (2018), https://www. 
census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/sanfranciscocitycalifornia,sanfranciscocountycalifornia/PST0452
17 (estimated 9.8% growth between 2010 and July 2017).  
63.  2010 CENSUS, CITY OF SEATTLE OFFICE OF PLANNING & COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 
(2010), https://www.seattle.gov/opcd/population-and-demographics/decennial-census#2010 
(approximately 8% growth rate between 2000 and 2010); accord POPULATION GROWTH IN 
WASHINGTON REMAINS STRONG, WASHINGTON STATE OFFICE OF FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 7 
(June 30, 2017), https://www.ofm.wa.gov/sites/default/files/public/legacy/pop/april1/ofm_april1_ 
press_release.pdf (noting that King County, where Seattle is located, grew by 2.31% from 2016 to 
2017 alone).  
64.  “Coastal elites” colloquially (and pejoratively) may refer to “any educated professional 
who lives in a major city in California or along the Eastern seaboard,” or more narrowly to “Wall 
Street executives” and other very-high-income coastal urbanites, David Masciotra, “Real 
Americans” vs. “Coastal Elites”: What Ring-Wing Sneers at City Dwellers Really Mean, SALON 
(Nov. 20, 2016), https://www.salon.com/2016/11/20/real-americans-vs-coastal-elites-what-right-
wing-sneers-at-city-dwellers-really-mean/.  The term, moreover, usually connotes (and derides) the 
liberal politics of the people living in those coastal communities, Salena Zito, Why Liberal Elites 
Are So Resentful of Middle America, N.Y. POST (Jan. 11, 2017), https://nypost.com/2017/01/11/ 
why-liberal-elites-are-so-resentful-of-middle-america/.  A simpler—and less polemical—meaning 
for “coastal elites” is meant for present purposes: cities which are geographically along the Atlantic 
and Pacific coasts of the United States, particularly those which have much higher incomes, higher 
living costs, and highly competitive economies compared to cities of any other region.  New York 
and San Francisco provide the signal, paradigmatic examples, but this loose definition would 
encompass Boston, Washington, Los Angeles, Seattle, and others as well.  Precision is less 
important than the general, theoretical organizing principle of the typology—that this subgroup of 
major cities is “different” in both normative and empirical senses, and thus merit individualized 
analysis of their unique conditions and development challenges. 
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population figures as they entered the twenty-first century.  Whereas 
Washington, D.C., Boston, and Minneapolis, among others, have seen large 
inflows of residents in recent years, none of the three has approached their 
mid-twentieth-century historical highs.  Hence, New York and San Francisco 
uniquely confront pressures of renewed growth without the literal and 
proverbial “room” found in those cities that experienced proportionally 
deeper population declines.  These specific cities—exemplars of challenges 
facing America’s coastal urban hubs—have less available space, fewer 
“infill” development opportunities, and significantly higher costs than others, 
e.g., the shrunken Rustbelt industrial centers or the sprawling, lower-density 
cities of the South and interior West. 
Although the affordable housing crisis increasingly is viewed 
(accurately) as a global phenomenon affecting the “superstar” cities and old 
industrial centers in both economically industrialized and industrializing 
places,65 America’s coastal urban areas face markedly dire statistical realities. 
Los Angeles, for example, has “just 14 public-housing facilities, with just 
over 6,500 [affordable, public housing] units, in a city of about 4 million 
people, an estimated 21.5 percent of whom live in poverty.”66  Meanwhile, 
New York City runs “326 [such] facilities,” which is roughly “23 times as 
many as [in] LA” and in a city with “double the population [of] and a lower 
poverty rate”67 than Los Angeles.  New York also manages a further “661 
buildings in the municipal [homeless] shelter system,”68 far more than any 
other American city, and it has benefited from long traditions of renter 
protections and vibrant tenant activist movements.69  Nonetheless, New 
York’s housing crisis remains a persistent, widespread emergency, 
disproportionately affecting its most-vulnerable residents.  As early as 2011, 
New York’s rental market included just under 425,000 units considered 
“affordable to extremely low income and very low income households” for a 
city with nearly 980,000 households meeting the same low-income 
 
65.  See, e.g., Richard Florida & Benjamin Schneider, The Global Housing Crisis, CITYLAB 
(Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/04/the-global-housing-crisis/557639/; 
Damien Sharkov, Homeless Numbers Up for First Time Since Great Recession, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 
6, 2017), http://www.newsweek.com/affordable-housing-crisis-forces-us-homeless-numbers-first-
time-great-739333 (ascribing the first post-recession increase in nationwide homelessness to 
widespread affordable housing crises); see also discussion infra, Part III(B). 
66.  Bryce Covert, The Deep, Uniquely American Roots of Our Affordable-Housing Crisis, 
NATION (May 24, 2018), https://www.thenation.com/article/give-us-shelter/.  
67.  Id. 
68.  Michael Greenberg, Tenants Under Siege: Inside New York City’s Housing Crisis, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS (Aug. 17, 2017), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2017/08/17/tenants-under-siege-
inside-new-york-city-housing-crisis/.  
69.  Isaac Chotiner, What’s Making NYC’s Housing Crisis Worse, and How to Fix It, SLATE 
(Aug. 8, 2017), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/interrogation/2017/08/what_s_ 
making_nyc_s_housing_crisis_worse_and_how_to_fix_it.html.  
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thresholds.70  By 2040, New York’s population likely will top nine million, 
further squeezing current, competitive rental markets citywide and revealing 
how Mayor Bill de Blasio’s plan to “build or preserve nearly 200,000 
affordable units” over coming years falls far short of the city’s projected 
needs.71  San Francisco’s efforts to contain and reverse its own housing crisis, 
much like New York’s, are at once historically ambitious and still far from 
sufficient.  The recently completed Natalie Grubb Commons, a development 
“reserved for households with incomes up to 50 percent of the local median,” 
featuring “complete homes, one-, two- and three-bedroom apartments with 
privacy, a sense of peace,” received a staggering 6,580 applications for the 
project’s 95 units, a ratio of almost 70:1.72 
Such challenges are endemic in other major cities along the country’s 
coasts—from Seattle to San Diego, Miami to Boston—but the intensity of 
these pressures accelerates almost exponentially among the subset of 
“superstar,” “elite” cities.  The present focus on these cities recognizes the 
stakes and the extremity of their challenges, but does so without minimizing 
or dismissing the challenges of other urban, suburban, and non-metropolitan 
communities across the United States.  Affordable and stable housing are 
ubiquitous challenges and demand a far more expansive stocktaking than is 
possible within the limits of a single article. 
 
B.  Elite Global Cities Under Pressure 
 
The renewed growth of America’s largest cities mirrors both historical 
patterns of urban development and the new millennium’s trends toward 
increased consolidation of economic power among relatively few “elite 
global” cities.73  Across the last several decades, urban observers and 
 
70.  PROBLEM: OUR CURRENT AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS, N.Y.C. HOUSING DEP’T 
(2018), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/housing/problem/problem.page.  
71.  Id. 
72.  Emily Badger, These 95 Apartments Promised Affordable Rent in San Francisco.  Then 
6,580 People Applied, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/12/upshot/ 
these-95-apartments-promised-affordable-rent-in-san-francisco-then-6580-people-applied.html 
(emphasis in original).  
73.  The phrases “elite city” and “global city” sometimes are used interchangeably herein, 
since various publications and researchers define them in overlapping yet divergent ways.  See supra 
note 58 and related discussion.  U.S.-based consulting firm A.T. Kearney offers one especially 
comprehensive set of measures, including a city’s positioning “to attract and retain global capital, 
people, and ideas,” a city’s cultivation of “entrepreneurship and innovation,” and indicators of 
economic, social, and political stability and institutional resiliency; among the 2017 Global Cities 
list, New York was identified as the world’s leading global city, while San Francisco was identified 
as leading the Global Cities Outlook list, which projects future performance based on current 
metrics.  Other American cities on the 2017 include Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington, DC, and 
Boston.  See Nicole Dessibourg, Mike Hales, & Andres Mendoza Pena, GLOBAL CITIES 2017: 
LEADERS IN A WORLD OF DISRUPTIVE INNOVATION, A.T. KEARNEY (2017), https://www.atke 
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academics alike have noted the globalized reach of major financial centers 
like New York, London, and Frankfurt over the even-larger and rapidly 
growing megacities of the industrializing world.74  While urbanization has 
long been seen as a prerequisite or co-requisite for economic development in 
industrializing states,75 this sustained concentration of economic, political, 
and financial power among incumbent global cities has continued for now at 
least.76 
The continued agglomeration of global wealth in the largest, incumbent 
major cities parallels domestic economic dynamics in the early twenty-first 
century.  In part, considerable attention has focused on major cities’ roles in 
skyrocketing income and wealth inequality across the United States.  Major 
coastal cities have been called “vast gated communities where the one 
percent reproduces itself,” with Manhattan, San Francisco, Miami, Boston, 
Washington, Oakland, Chicago, and Los Angeles all highlighted for having 
especially severe inequalities.77  Put differently, the ongoing trends of 
 
arney.com/global-cities/full-report.  The concept of “elite/global cities,” however, should be 
distinguished from metrics emphasizing quality of life or other social wellbeing indicia; a “global 
city” connotes economic, financial, and cultural power, which may be correlated with higher quality 
of life, but is not necessarily so.  For example, only Portland, Oregon, ranked among the top 25 
“Most Livable Cities” list by UK-based Monocle magazine in 2017, which was otherwise dominated 
by the largest cosmopolitan cities in high-income Asia (e.g., Tokyo, Singapore, Hong Kong), 
Europe (e.g., Amsterdam, Berlin, Hamburg), and Oceana (e.g., Melbourne, Auckland); accord 
Casey Baseel, Tokyo Ranked as Most Livable City in the World in Monocle Annual Survey, JAPAN 
TODAY (July 10, 2017), https://japantoday.com/category/features/lifestyle/tokyo-ranked-as-most-
livable-city-in-the-world-in-monocle-annual-survey.  For present purposes, these distinctions are 
less consequential than the general ordering principle: among America’s major cities, irrespective 
of foregoing “elite” typologies, New York (always included in “elite” and “global” cities lists) and 
San Francisco (often included) are assumed to be within the more-general universe of economically 
and culturally powerful urban centers.  
74.  See generally David Meyer, The World System of Cities: Relations between International 
Financial Metropolises and South American Cities, 64 SOC. FORCES 553 (1986).  
75.  Patricia Clarke Annez & Robert Buckley, Urbanization and Growth: Setting the Context 
1–2, in URBANIZATION AND GROWTH: COMMISSION ON GROWTH AND DEVELOPMENT, WORLD 
BANK (2009). 
76.  See, e.g., REDEFINING GLOBAL CITIES: THE SEVEN TYPES OF GLOBAL METRO 
ECONOMIES 2, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION/JPMORGAN CHASE (2016) (noting that more than half the 
world’s population now lives in major cities, with growth rates among industrializing countries’ 
largest cities vastly outpacing the traditional urban centers of finance and economic power, although 
the “global giants”—New York, Los Angeles, Tokyo, Osaka-Kobe, Paris, and London—remain 
“key nodes in global capital and talent flows”).  See also David A. Graham, Red State, Blue City, 
ATLANTIC (Mar. 2017) (discussing the political transformation of American cities in recent decades, 
highlighted by the sharply partisan urban/rural divide in the 2016 election and major American 
cities’ resurgent, sometimes overtly confrontational approach toward state and federal 
governments—trends likely to continue in coming years).  
77.  Joel Kotkin, Where Inequality Is Worst in the United States, FORBES (Mar. 20, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/joelkotkin/2014/03/20/where-inequality-is-worst-in-the-united-stat 
es/#24748190327c.  Further secondary research has suggested over decades that such deep 
inequality can not only stifle opportunities for those in greatest need, but also in certain 
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concentrating power among relatively few affluent urban regions plays out 
on both levels of analysis, global and domestic. 
The gains from having more powerful urban centers as a counterweight 
to central governments, which largely have abandoned partaking in modern 
urban policymaking, are offset by the losses to the urban communities which 
still receive disproportionately little attention and financial support in these 
booming metropolises.  Still, the global is increasingly local indeed.  
Longstanding patterns of inequality are now being compounded by the 
renewed “successes” of major cities, while wealth continues to flow toward 
the same few individuals and institutions along each of these local, regional, 
national, and global dimensions.  As such, the focus of this paper emphasizes 
the panoply of implications for those most-vulnerable communities at the 
heart of the CED movement and how activists within those networks might 
be able to leverage these trends—especially massive capital investments in 
the largest urban development projects—for those in greatest need. 
 
C. Defining Community Development and Positive CED Outcomes 
 
Among the “core definitions” of community economic development 
(“CED”) are those which “[embrace] efforts to develop housing, jobs, or 
business opportunities for low-income people” in a geographically bounded 
community.78  Other components of CED include “a leading role played by 
nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations” and those institutions’ 
“[accountability] to residentially defined communities.”79  Regardless of the 
precise definition considered and applied, however, the overriding theme of 
CED—as a movement, as a strategy for improving the social welfare of low-
income communities, and as a method of community organization more 
generally—is that the community remains the focus: economic development 
must benefit the extant community to fall within the ambit of CED.80 
CED commonly encompasses both retrospective and prospective 
challenges facing low-income, often long-marginalized communities.  The 
CED movement expressly frames activist involvement and direction of new 
development in terms of past wrongs (e.g., remedying past environmental 
 
circumstances might lead to social dislocations—and even political violence.  See, e.g., Lee 
Sigelman & Miles Simpson, A Cross-National Test of the Linkage between Economic Inequality 
and Political Violence, 21 J. CONFLICT RESOLUTION 105 (1977); accord Sean Fox & Kristian 
Hoelscher, Political Order, Development, and Social Violence, 49 J. PEACE RESEARCH 431 (2012) 
(affirming empirical research suggesting an inequality—political violence nexus, while adding that 
institutional weaknesses—transitional or weakly institutionalized democratic states, highly 
contested authoritarian regimes—also play a role).  
78.  WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT MOVEMENT: LAW, 
BUSINESS & THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY 3 (2001).  
79.  Id.  
80.  Id.  
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damage through “reparations” and compensating communities damaged, 
carved up, or altogether displaced during earlier eras of so-called “urban 
renewal.”)81  CED activists’ goals are also critically forward-looking, both in 
terms of preventing development from repeating earlier disasters and as a 
means “to prevent further marginalization and decisions . . . [impacting] 
current and future residents in [a given] area,” affording locals a voice in 
decision-making processes and at least some agency over precise outcomes.82  
Sustainable “self-empowerment” and infusing urban planning institutions 
with “democratic participation” undergird CED.83  Hence, CED and its 
broader aims should be viewed not as hyper-specific reactions to individual 
developments, but rather as bottom-up organizing efforts which become 
habitual, sustainable, and perpetual movements.  Most ambitiously, CED 
seeks to transform urban leaders’ mindsets from a “pro-growth” orientation 
to a “value-conscious” growth model, one which maximizes communities’ 
long-term security and prospects.84 
 
D. CED in a New Millennium of Re-Urbanization 
 
Recent shifts in demographic trends across the United States have 
accelerated pressures on already vulnerable urban communities, those very 
communities at the center of the CED movement’s mission.  Over 80 percent 
of Americans lived in urban areas as of the 2010 Census, nearly two percent 
higher than in 2000, with growth in urban centers outpacing the overall 
population growth rate by a similar margin.85  In part accelerated by the Great 
Recession, during which younger workers flocked toward major cities for job 
opportunities, this trend could be slowing but not ending quite yet.86  
Moreover, even in higher-density regions where growth has slowed, as in 
 
81.  Emma T. Lucas-Darby, Community Benefits Agreements: A Case Study in Addressing 
Environmental and Economic Injustices, 97 J. AFRICAN AM. HIST. 92, 93–98 (2012).  
82.  Id. at 99. 
83.  Id. at 99–100; accord Robyn Eversole, Community Agency and Community Engagement: 
Re-theorising Participation in Governance, 31 J. PUB. POL’Y 51 (2011) (arguing for more open-
ended conceptualizations of participatory governance across many contexts, including both bottom-
up and top-down models for encouraging community engagement in local decision-making of all 
kinds).  For more-generalized discussions of business actors’ models of engagement in community 
development, and economic development at the national and global levels of analysis, see, e.g., 
Ananya Mukherjee Reed & Darryl Reed, Partnerships for Development: Four Models of Business 
Development, 90 J. BUS. ETHICS 3 (2009).  
84.  Colleen Cain, Negotiating with the Growth Machine: Community Benefits Agreements 
and Value-Conscious Growth, 29 SOC. FORUM 937 (2014).  
85.  U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, GROWTH IN URBAN POPULATION 
OUTPACES REST OF NATION, CENSUS BUREAU REPORTS (Mar. 26, 2012), https://www.census.gov/ 
newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html. 
86.  Laura Lorenzetti, America’s Urban Population Boom Is Slowing Down, FORTUNE, May 
19, 2016, http://fortune.com/2016/05/19/urban-population-growth-slowing/. 
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Metropolitan New York and the San Francisco Bay Area, ongoing growth of 
any degree strains already hypercompetitive housing markets.87  Given these 
interacting forces (economic pressures for young, relatively affluent, mobile 
Americans to move to cities; a shortage of new and recently built housing; 
the rapidly escalating cost of living in dense urban centers, etc.)88 the 
pressures on lower-income communities that long predate this recent urban 
boom have increased in lockstep.  The CED movement broadly emphasizes 
improving employment, housing, and other services for local communities, 
developing bottom-up institutions that are responsive to those communities’ 
needs.  The movement’s constitutive institutions now face even greater 
demands than before, especially in these aforementioned, dense coastal 
cities.89   
City density, on its own, is a significant consideration for America’s 
urban planners, developers, and community leaders.90  Traditionally, the 
 
87.  For example, nearly as many housing units were permitted in Manhattan in 1960 as in the 
entire decade of the 1990s, with similar building patterns in San Francisco and the Bay Area.  See, 
e.g., Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of Housing Supply, 32 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 3 (2018).  
88.  See, e.g., Bourree Lam, The Recovery’s Geographic Disparities, ATLANTIC, Feb. 26, 
2016, https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2016/02/eig-distressed-communities/471177/ 
(citing reports by the Economic Innovation Group, ranking 25,000 U.S. zip codes according to 
“economic distress” factors, which ranked various central San Francisco [94102, 94103, 94109] and 
Manhattan [10001, 10017] zip codes among the least distressed nationally).  The booming 
economies of these urban cores overlay with the general distributional patterns of the post-Great 
Recession recovery: most income gains have accrued to the top income-earners, who tend to live in 
the largest metropolitan areas, where industries like finance dominate.  Annie Lowrey, The Rich 
Get Richer Through the Recovery, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2013, https://economix.blogs.nytimes.co 
m/2013/09/10/the-rich-get-richer-through-the-recovery/.  See generally, ECONOMIC INNOVATION 
GROUP, THE 2016 DISTRESSED COMMUNITIES INDEX (Feb. 2016), http://eig.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/02/2016-Distressed-Communities-Index-Report.pdf; Richard Florida, Geographic 
Inequality Is Swallowing the Recovery, CITYLAB, May 23, 2016, https://www.citylab.com/ 
equity/2016/05/there-are-more-losers-than-winners-in-americas-economic-recovery-due-to-geogra 
phic-inequality/483989/ (citing the same EIG report’s finding that, when measuring economic 
recovery by new business establishments at the county-level measure, nearly half of all new 
business starts took place in just 20 counties, which included Los Angeles [number 1], Miami-Dade 
[2], Kings/Brooklyn [3], Harris/Houston [4], and the two running examples of San Francisco [17] 
and Manhattan [19], with particular concentrations across the Sunbelt and the American West; the 
report noted that job growth patterns follow the same trends as new business openings generally).  
89.  In part, the focus of this paper focuses predominantly on the largest coastal urban areas—
the San Francisco Bay Area and New York City—not because they are the only metropolitan regions 
experiencing the phenomena examined, but rather because of the extremity and acuteness of their 
challenges.  The densest coastal cities face extreme costs in locating, funding, and building in their 
urban cores, whereas the lower-density development patterns of, e.g., the Sunbelt and Southeastern 
United States face comparatively lower development costs; see generally Richard Lloyd, 
Urbanization and the Southern United States, 38 ANN. REV. SOC. 483 (2012).  
90.  See generally Witold Rybczynski, Dense, Denser, Densest, 35 WILSON Q. 46 (2011) 
(overviewing generally the economic/financial costs and environmental risks underlying recent 
arguments in favor of densifying American cities and curtailing suburban sprawl).  
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United States’ largest cities have not been as dense as their European 
counterparts; Europe historically has been one of the densest population 
centers globally.91  Nonetheless, generations of consistently rapid population 
growth in the United States has necessitated a gradual clustering of American 
households, regardless of the vast open spaces in the country’s interior.92  The 
core of Paris has over 50,000 inhabitants per square mile, and even the 
broader, 12-million-member Ile-de-France region surrounding the center of 
Paris has well over 20,000 inhabitants per square mile.93  New York, 
America’s densest city, has just over 27,000 people per square mile94 (though 
Manhattan itself has nearly triple that, at over 70,000).95  The example of 
Paris—much like Barcelona, Brussels, and London, among other major 
European cities—suggests that density and quality of life need not always 
run in opposing directions, hence American urbanists’ longstanding acclaim 
for and desires to replicate elements of European cities’ development 
models.96 
These lessons are instructive for the leading case studies at the heart of 
this paper, New York and San Francisco, which must accommodate swelling 
residential populations within the most competitive, resource-constrained 
real estate markets in the United States.  The necessity of densification 
follows decades of urbanists “singing the praises of urban density” as a 
potential economic driver with health, environmental, and resource 
 
91.  Stephan Klasen & Thorsten Nestmann, Population, Population Density and 
Technological Change, 19 J. POP. ECON. 611, 618 (2006) (finding that the “Old World,” including 
the Middle East and North Africa, Central and Western Europe, and Asia, not only had the highest 
population and density of major global regions, but also that density patterns over millennia 
predicted well with modern economic performance and technological innovation).  
92.  Nathan Keyfitz, Population Density and the Style of Social Life, 16 BIOSCIENCE 868, 870 
(1966) (using a standard 1.5% U.S. population growth rate as a basis for concluding that, eventually, 
“dispersion [of people broadly across the United States will in a few generations] become 
impossible; no amount of redeployment would enable us to get out of sight of one another”); 
compare Alice Taylor Day & Lincoln H. Day, Cross-National Comparison of Population Density, 
181 SCI. 1016, 1017 (1973) (noting that on a per capita/national basis, the U.S. still has a very low 
population density—only 55 people per square mile as of the early 1970s—ranking near the bottom 
globally); Walter Swanton, Land Value Trends in the United States, 24 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 163, 
169 (1965). 
93.  PARONAMA – ILE-DE-FRANCE (Data), INSTITUT NATIONAL DE LA STATISTIQUE ET DES 
ÉTUDES ÉCONOMIQUES (2018), https://www.insee.fr/fr/statistiques/2018915.  
94.  NEW YORK CITY POPULATION, NEW YORK CITY PLANNING (2018), https://www1.nyc. 
gov/site/planning/data-maps/nyc-population/population-facts.page.  
95.  Eric Jaffe, Watch 210 Years of Manhattan Densification in 2 Minutes, CITYLAB (June 3, 
2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2015/06/watch-210-years-of-manhattan-densification-in-2-
minutes/394736/ (illustrating that Manhattan’s density peaked between 1890 and 1910, before 
settling near its current rate from the 1980s onward).  
96.  See, e.g., Feargus O’Sullivan, Lessons from Europe’s Densest Neighborhoods, CITYLAB 
(Mar. 28, 2018), http://www.citylab.com/life/2018/03/density-european-cities-maps/555503/; 
accord Amos Hawley, Population Density and the City, 9 DEMOGRAPHY 521 (1972).  
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conservation advantages.97  It also, however, faces stringent constraints in 
existing high-density cities.  The most-daunting constraints include the 
prevalence of development-deterring land use policies in “growing, land-
constrained metropolitan areas [and] cities where preexisting land values 
[are] high and worth protecting,” especially where physical barriers—
mountains, bodies of water, or political-jurisdictional lines—prevent access 
to new land.98  Furthermore, as these cities grow, the proximity premium for 
housing near a city’s business and commercial centers (e.g., the referent 
city’s central business district (CBD)) is amplified and exaggerated—
stretching ever-further distances beyond a city core—while accelerating 
increasing home values.99  The tensions are manifold and overlapping in 
these signal cases.  Densification is necessary for reducing housing pressures, 
yet density promoting developments can displace vulnerable residents, 
directly and indirectly.  Denser development can work in tandem with transit 
system improvements, but they may also exacerbate already overloaded 
urban bus, subway, and rail networks. 
Environmental and sustainability concerns compound these challenges 
for twenty-first century cities both in the United States and around the world.  
The specter of climate change makes denser urban development patterns 
imperative for long-term livability.100  Among other approaches, rejuvenating 
and repurposing old industrial sites has become a recurring theme in pursuit 
of sustainability goals.  Post-industrial opportunities for redevelopment, 
especially in the increasingly service-sector-oriented cities of the 
industrialized world, have turned to rehabilitation of the last century’s largest 
infrastructure projects (e.g., port facilities).101  As the industrializing world 
works to close economic gaps, similar waterfront redevelopment 
opportunities have gained attention in places like Zanzibar, Tanzania as 
well.102  These global trends, in the American context, have translated into 
myriad, often novel legal arrangements for guaranteeing environmental and 
 
97.  David Roberts, Want to Reduce the Energy Used by Buildings? Make Cities Denser, VOX 
(Nov. 26, 2017), https://www.vox.com/science-and-health/2017/1/26/14388942/building-energy-
use-density; accord Vishaan Chakrabarti, Building Hyperdensity and Civic Delight, PLACES J. (June 
2013), https://placesjournal.org/article/building-hyperdensity-and-civic-delight/ (providing an 
example of a “maximalist” approach to densification, pulling from both quantitative and qualitative 
research comparing global leaders in urban housing density).  
98.  Albert Saiz, The Geographic Determinants of Housing Supply, 125 Q.J. ECON. 1253, 1257 
(2010).  
99.  Id. at 1263–64.  
100.  Jennifer Welch, Forum: Green Urban Worlds, 97 ANNALS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF AM. 
GEOGRAPHERS 373 (2007); V. Kelly Turner, Obstacles to Developing Sustainable Cities: The Real 
Estate Rigidity Trap, 22 ECOLOGY & SOCIETY (2017).  
101.  Brian Hoyle, Global and Local Change on the Port-City Waterfront, 90 GEO. REV. 395 
(2000).  
102.  Brian Hoyle, Urban Waterfront Revitalization in Developing Countries: The Example of 
Zanzibar’s Stone Town, 168 GEO. J. 141 (2002).  
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economic justice imperatives.  Key among these are CBAs.103  In these 
tailored agreements, communities may be empowered to exact 
“environmental reparations” for the “historical and current damages to [their] 
neighborhoods and communities through redevelopment projects,” 
emphasizing environmental protection and local community economic 
empowerment.104  As increasingly powerful epicenters of the global economy 
continue growing against constraints of aging infrastructure and limited 
physical space, the challenges facing their community activists and low-
income residents are accelerating as well, particularly after the financial crisis 
and Great Recession.105 
At a smaller scale, New York City’s High Line project similarly sought 
to convert the long-shuttered 10th-11th Avenues elevated rail line (“El”) into 
a landscaped park trail in the middle of Manhattan.106  Closed in the early 
1950s, the El train network had become an anachronistic urban transit 
system, dwarfed and largely shoved aside by contemporaneous expansions 
of New York’s subway system.107  One of the social effects of the El in its 
heyday was that it blurred public and private spaces, where both lower- and 
middle-income Manhattan apartments—and their windows, balconies, and 
fire escapes—brushed against the public transit network and public streets 
directly.108  After 60 years of neglect, the rejuvenated High Line brought back 
that “dialogue that undid the separation between the public, semiprivate 
domestic, and private spheres.”109  Other environmentally conscious projects 
in New York and around the world have sought to revitalize urban 
biodiversity, providing new or rebuilt habitats as well as public spaces for 
surrounding communities to commune.110  Several other cities have sought 
to emulate New York’s successes accordingly.111 
 
103.  Emma T. Lucas-Darby, Community Benefit Agreements: A Case Study in Addressing 
Environmental and Economic Injustices, 97 J. AFRICAN AM. HISTORY 92 (2012).  
104.  Id. at 92–93.  
105.  Eugenie Birch & Susan Wachter, Introduction: The Shape of the New American City, 
626 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6 (2009).  
106.  Sunny Stalter, Farewell to the El: Nostalgic Urban Visuality on the Third Avenue 
Elevated Train, 58 AM. Q. 869 (2006). 
107.  Id.  
108.  Id. at 879.  
109.  Id.  Accord Jared Keller, First Drafts: James Corners’ High Line Park, ATLANTIC (July 
5, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2011/07/first-drafts-james-corners-
high-line-park/240695/.  
110.  See, e.g., Richard Blaustein, Urban Biodiversity Gains New Converts, 63 BIOSCIENCE 
72 (2013) (mentioning in addition to the High Line projects such as Teardrop Park in Lower 
Manhattan, Singapore’s “Butterfly Trail,” and the restoration of Jamaica Bay wetlands, also in New 
York).  
111.  Leonard Greene, New York’s High Line Inspires Other Cities to Build Similar Parks, 
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 28, 2018), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/new-york-high-line-
inspires-cities-build-similar-parks-article-1.4014330 (among the cities seeking to emulate New 
York’s repurposing of old industrial infrastructure are Miami, Chicago, Philadelphia, London, and 
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Despite its acclaim, the High Line has seemingly accelerated the 
development of ultra-high-end projects clamoring for views of and access to 
the elevated park.  Among these are the luxury condominium project at 520 
West 28th designed by the late Zaha Hadid,112 an “art and performance 
space” called “the Shed” described as “the latest spectacle along New York’s 
High Line,” which is adjacent to another massive development at the northern 
terminus of the High Line, the Hudson Yards redevelopment,113 and a host of 
smaller-scale, yet similarly high-end apartment and condominium projects in 
the vicinity.114  As such, even the High Line’s designers and strongest early 
proponents have raised concerns over whether the project fulfils one of its 
key aims at its inception: improving and serving the needs of nearby 
communities.115 
The rising political power and influence of major cities has been 
heralded by numerous media and academic commentators in recent years.116  
 
Albany, New York).  
112.  Lucy Wang, New Images Capture Zaha Hadid’s Luxury High Line Condos in NYC, 
INHABITAT (Mar. 16, 2018), https://inhabitat.com/nyc/new-images-capture-zaha-hadids-luxury-
high-line-condos-in-nyc/.  
113.  Michael Kimmelman, Have You Seen This? N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 13, 2017), https://www. 
nytimes.com/interactive/2017/08/13/arts/high-line-shed-shell.html.  
114.  Kim Velsey, A Would-Be Developer Chooses a Neighborhood Under Construction, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 2, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/02/realestate/would-be-developer-huds 
on-yards-manhattan.html.  See also Alya Abourezk, New Renderings Reveal Thomas Heatherwick’s 
Design for Residential Towers Straddling NYC’s Highline, ARCH DAILY (Jan. 15, 2018), https:// 
www.archdaily.com/887010/new-renderings-reveal-thomas-heatherwicks-design-for-residential-
towers-straddling-nycs-highline; Kristin Tablang, 5 Luxury Condos Sprouting Up Along New York 
City’s High Line, FORBES (Feb. 28, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristintablang/2015/02/ 
28/5-luxury-condos-new-york-city-high-line/#76c69f88390e.  
115.  Andrew Davis, Unintended Consequences: Friends of the High Line Founder Raises 
Concern about Park’s Success, ARCHITECT’S NEWSPAPER (Feb. 24, 2017), https://archpaper.com/ 
2017/02/high-line-founder-raises-concern/.  
116.  See generally Ian Klaus, When Mayors Spoke Up, CITYLAB (Dec. 29, 2017), https:// 
www.citylab.com/equity/2017/12/when-mayors-spoke-up/549356/ (noting U.S. majors’ roles as 
participants in and organizers of various global conferences relating to, among other things, climate 
change, in lieu of the traditional federal government’s leadership on key global concerns); accord 
Kriston Capps, Mayors Take the Fight for Affordable Housing to Capitol Hill, CITYLAB (Jan. 29, 
2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/01/mayors-take-the-fight-for-affordable-housing-to-
capitol-hill/551618/ (reporting on a coalition of mayors, launched by the late San Francisco Mayor 
Ed Lee, to pressure Congress on affordable housing policy and funding); Nicole Flatow, Cities 
Launch Plan to Protect Net Neutrality, CITYLAB (Mar. 12, 2018), https://www.city lab.com/ 
equity/2018/03/net-neutrality-executive-orders-fcc-mayors-bill-de-blasio/555344/; Juliana Kerr, 
Want Immigration Reform? Look to Cities, CITYLAB (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www. citylab.com/eq 
uity2018/01/want-immigration-reform-look-to-cities/551261/; Teresa Mathew, How Cities Can 
Take a Stand on Cannabis, CITYLAB (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2018/ 1/ how-
cities-can-take-a-stance-on-cannabis/549833/; Tanvi Misra, How the DOJ Is Broadening Its Attack 
on Sanctuary Cities, CITYLAB (Jan. 25, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/equity/ 2018/01/how-the-
doj-is-broadening-its-attack-on-sanctuary-cities/551396/ (reporting significant federal pushback 
against sanctuary cities, including a recent collection of 23 letters sent from the DOJ to the largest 
cities opposing federal immigration crackdowns). 
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Yet, these same cities face enormous internal pressures and challenges, 
particularly those otherwise deemed “most successful” in the new 
millennium, such as New York and San Francisco.  The tragic irony of these 
urban powerhouses, from a CED perspective, is that they have seen 
dramatically increased investments in all types of real estate development 
projects while simultaneously combatting lingering post-recession social and 
economic crises affecting their neediest citizens.  Put another way, America’s 
erstwhile booming cities have proven unable to absorb the added pressures 
of their own successes, becoming microcosms of the asymmetric American 
economic recovery unto themselves. 
 
III.  Mega-Projects, Historical Development, and Recent Trends  
 
A. Defining Mega-Projects and Key Examples 
 
These recent demographic and economic shifts have paralleled changes 
in the built environments of the “beneficiary” cities.  New York City 
exemplifies the reinvigorated boom in “supertall” skyscrapers117 and other 
mega-projects,118 but by no means is it alone.  In Los Angeles, for example, 
 
117.  A “supertall” building is defined as one exceeding 300 meters/984 feet in height.  
COUNCIL ON TALL BUILDINGS AND URBAN HABITAT, CTBUH HEIGHT CRITERIA FOR MEASURING 
& DEFINING TALL BUILDINGS, http://www.ctbuh.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=zvoB1S4nMug=; 
as of January 2018, New York City has 24 supertall buildings either in planning stages, under 
construction, or already completed, NYC’s Supertall Skyscraper Boom, Explained, CURBED N.Y., 
Jan. 22, 2018, https://ny.curbed.com/maps/new-york-skyscraper-construction-supertalls; notably, 
many of the proposed, under-construction, and recently completed supertall towers in Manhattan—
unlike those of previous generations—are primarily residential buildings, like Central Park Tower, 
80 South Street (half-residential), and 111 West 57th Street, all over 1,400 feet.  Id.  For purposes 
of this essay, these definitions will be used more flexibly, including structures which fall just short 
of a “supertall” and those which both exceed 750 feet and are among the five-tallest structures in a 
central urban area.  Keeping this definition open and flexible ensures greater numbers of available 
cases and comparisons, while recognizing that cities of different sizes may experience similar 
outcomes despite differences in a project’s absolute size or height alone.  
118.  The term “mega-project” reflects several common meanings.  In the context of 
infrastructure planning and investment, “mega-projects” refer to large public or industrial projects 
like dams, highways, and airports.  Joseph S. Szyliowicz & Andrew R. Goetz, Getting Realistic 
about Megaproject Planning: The Case of the New Denver International Airport, 28 POL’Y SCI. 
347 (1995).  Urban planning and development—i.e., those disciplines focusing more on mixed-use, 
large, and/or master-planned projects—have a separate conception of “mega-projects” or 
“megadevelopments”; see, e.g., Kane Pham, Clearing Stock of the Invisible: Effects of 
Cosmopolitan Power on the Supply of Affordable Housing, in FROM CONFLICT TO INCLUSION IN 
HOUSING: INTERACTION OF COMMUNITIES, RESIDENTS, AND ACTIVISTS 120 (Graham Cairns, 
Georgios Artopoulos, & Kirsten Day eds., 2017) (terming the Barangaroo precinct redevelopment 
on Sydney’s waterfront a “mega-project,” with a 22-acre, mixed-use redevelopment of a former 
shipping container terminal).  As with flagship skyscraper projects, the terms “mega-project” and 
“megadevelopment” are used both interchangeably and flexibly.  For simplicity, a “mega-project” 
would include with total costs upon completion in excess of $1 billion, irrespective of buildout 
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the recently completed Wilshire Grand (currently the tallest building both in 
the city and in any American city west of Chicago)119 will soon be joined by 
other supertall towers approved or already under construction.120  In San 
Francisco, the thirty-feet shorter Salesforce Tower recently topped out at 
1,170 feet, with a $1.1 billion price tag, as part of a massive public-private 
redevelopment of the adjoining portions of the South of Market 
neighborhood.121  From Philadelphia122 to Chicago123 to Miami124 to 
 
heights or square footage.  For smaller cities without established projects of this scale, comparative 
cases and examples may embrace developments with total buildout costs below $1 billion, e.g., the 
Amazon headquarters development in Seattle, Washington: while none of Amazon’s buildings 
individually meets either a supertall or mega-project definition alone, the company has added nearly 
10 million square feet of office space to downtown Seattle, over 2.5 million of which was completed 
during 2016 alone.  Mike Rosenberg, Record Construction Frenzy Sweeps Downtown Seattle; More 
Buildings to Come, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 10, 2017, https://www.seattletimes.com/business/real-
estate/record-construction-frenzy-sweeps-downtown-seattle-with-more-building-to-come/. 
119.  Jenna Chandler, The Wilshire Grand—LA’s Tallest Tower—Opens Today, CURBED 
L.A., June 23, 2017, https://la.curbed.com/2017/6/23/15860186/wilshire-grand-tower-los-angeles-
opening. 
120.  Among other planned projects are Angels Knoll (or Angels Landing), including an 88-
story centerpiece for a $1.2 billion mixed-use complex; 1045 S. Olive Street, a 70-story, all-
residential tower in Downtown Los Angeles; and 913 S. Figueroa Street, a 66-story mixed-use tower 
which would become the city’s third tallest upon completion.  See Jenna Chandler & Elijah Chiland, 
Mapping the Rise of LA’s Tallest Towers, CURBED L.A., Jan. 22, 2018, https://la.curbed.com/maps/ 
tower-highrise-construction-map-los-angeles; Bianca Barragan, City Council Approves Angels 
Landing Plan that Would Bring 88-Story Tower, Elementary School to Bunker Hill, CURBED L.A., 
Dec. 13, 2017, https://la.curbed.com/2017/12/12/16767876/angels-landing-development-macfarla 
ne-handel.   
121.  Rachel Lewis, Salesforce Tower is Now San Francisco’s Tallest Building, FORTUNE, 
Aug. 16, 2017, http://fortune.com/2017/08/16/san-francisco-salesforce-tower-finished/.  See also 
John King, Neighborhood on the Rise, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 27, 2017, http://projects.sfchronicle. 
com/2017/transbay-terminal/the-future/ (discussing both Salesforce Tower and adjacent 
redevelopment projects across the “Transbay Center” project’s dozen blocks and 145 acres, just 
south of the city’s Financial District).  
122.  The under-construction Comcast Technology Center is Philadelphia’s most-prominent 
example.  When completed, the 1,121-foot tower will become the city’s tallest structure—and its 
first supertall, nearly 200 feet taller than the Comcast Center, across the street.  Melissa Romero, 15 
Things to Expect When Comcast Technology Center Opens This Year, CURBED PHILLY, Jan. 8, 
2018, https://philly.curbed.com/2018/1/8/16862492/comcast-technology-center-tower-amenities-
fact-sheet. 
123.  The 98-floor, 1,389-foot Trump International Hotel & Tower topped out in 2009, 
becoming one of the world’s 20-tallest buildings and the city-s second-highest, after Willis Tower.  
CTBUH, Trump International Hotel & Tower, CTBUH Global Tall Building Database (2018), 
http://www.skyscrapercenter.com/building/trump-international-hotel-tower/203; accord Elizabeth 
Butler, Second Chances for the Second City’s Vacant Properties: An Analysis of Chicago’s Policy 
Approaches to Vacancy, Abandonment, & Blight [note], 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 233 (2016). 
124.  The Panorama Tower recently overtook the Four Seasons as Miami’s tallest tower, at 
868 feet.  Johnny Diaz, Miami’s New Panorama Tower to Be Tallest Building in Florida, SUN 
SENTINEL (Miami), July 10, 2017, http://www.sun-sentinel.com/features/sfl-fea-tallest-buildings-
in-miami-20170710-photogallery.html. 
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Houston125 numerous supertall or near-supertall towers and other mega-
projects have been completed, begun construction, or gained approval over 
the last few years.  Cities beyond the traditional urban cores of major 
metropolitan regions (e.g., Jersey City, New Jersey,126 and the Tysons Corner 
area of Fairfax County, Virginia,127 just southwest of Washington, DC) are 
also seeing massive alterations to their historic skylines. 
Mega-projects are defined loosely as singular projects (with or without 
phased development plans over years or decades) with total costs exceeding 
$1 billion in the largest U.S. cities.128  Many mega-projects include signature 
skyscrapers, often supertalls,129 as well as quintessential “mixed-use” spaces 
(i.e., combined commercial, residential, hospitality, and other functions in 
one).130 
 
125.  609 Main Street joined Houston’s skyline in 2016, with just over one million square feet 
and 48 floors; however, breaking the pattern of the foregoing cities, it topped out at 757 feet, well 
below the “supertall” designation.  See Allyn West, 609 Main: A Different Skyscraper, HOUSTON 
CHRON., May 19, 2017, https://www.houstonchronicle.com/local/gray-matters/article/609-Main-
A-different-skyscraper-11153566.php#photo-12920686. 
126.  See, e.g., the 30 Hudson Street development, including a 781-foot signature tower 
completed in 2004, CTBUH, 30 Hudson Street (Jersey City), CTBUH Global Tall Building 
Database (2018), http://www.skyscrapercenter.com/building/30-hudson-street/1025. 
127.  The Capital One Headquarters project, including a 470-foot signature tower.  Brian 
Trompeter, Capital One’s Tysons Campus Set for Major Growth, INSIDE NOVA, Jan. 12, 2018, 
http://www.insidenova.com/news/arlington/capital-one-s-tysons-campus-set-for-major-growthart 
icle_6d597970-f78c-11e7-baaf-a3e2c660e8ce.html.  Although significantly shorter than other 
developments mentioned, Capital One’s building will be the second-tallest in the Washington, DC 
metropolitan region, just behind the 555-foot Washington Monument across the Potomac, 
representing a major shift in the urban fabric of the area.  Capital One Approved to Build Wegmans, 
Event Center, Parks in Tysons, FAIRFAX COUNTY BOARD OF SUPERVISORS, TYSONS, July 12, 2017, 
https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/news2/capital-one-approved-to-build-wegmans-event-center-park 
s-in-tysons/.  In a sense, Tysons epitomizes the definitional difficulties in identifying “mega-
projects”—while the Capital One complex itself falls far short of such a project itself, it is one 
component of a massive redevelopment plan: the Tysons Corner Comprehensive Plan, a 50-year 
buildout of the area’s urbanizing core, at the confluence of the Silver and Orange Metrorail lines.  
Upon realization in 2050, the plan will apartment and condominium units for 100,000 residents, 
office and commercial space for 200,000 workers, and millions of square feet of new building space, 
at a cost of billions.  See, e.g., TYSONS COMPREHENSIVE PLAN, FAIRFAX COUNTY BOARD OF 
SUPERVISORS (2017), https://www.fairfaxcounty.gov/tysons/sites/tysons/files/assets/documents/ 
pdf/comprehensive_plan/fc_comp_plan2017ed_tysons_amended04_04_2017.pdf. 
128.  See supra note 118 and related discussion.  
129.  See supra notes 120-126 and related discussion. 
130.  See, e.g., Christopher Hawthorne, Wilshire Grand Center, the New Tallest Building in 
L.A. and a Schmoozer in the Skyline, L.A. TIMES (June 24, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/entertain 
ment/arts/la-et-cm-wilshire-grand-review-20170624-htmlstory.html (“The Wilshire Grand Center 
opened . . . as the tallest building in [Los Angeles, holding] meeting rooms and 365,000 square feet 
of class A office space . . . a 900-room InterContinental Hotel . . . and a collection of bars and 
restaurants at the top); TIME WARNER CENTER, RELATED PROPERTIES (2018), http://www. 
related.com/our-company/properties/65/Time-Warner-Center (cataloguing the components of the 
TWC, to include dozens of stores, several restaurants and bars, the Time Warner, Inc. World 
Headquarters and other offices, as well as hotel and residential space).  
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Looking to these mega-projects helps to recognize both the increased 
pace of investments in the recent post-recession recovery as well as the scope 
of opportunities for leveraging massive financing for local communities’ 
needs.  These developments concentrate enormous sums of money in small 
areas, for better and worse.  They at least temporarily boost employment 
during their construction, and may improve long-term employment prospects 
depending upon the nature of new businesses and other employment centers 
included within them.131  Finally, because of their high-profile nature, they 
tend to generate immediate public awareness and mobilizing effects, whether 
supportive, oppositional, or mixed.  Given these interacting considerations, 
the risks and potential rewards of mega-projects for CED, how new and 
existing strategies for exacting concessions from developers might work 
more generally, all merit deeper exploration. 
 
B. Mega-projects as Potential Threats to CED 
 
Any flood of largely private development dollars—albeit often in 
conjunction with public incentives, subsidies, or other partnerships—
threatens to squeeze CED opportunities out of already competitive markets.  
However, the emergent prominence of mega-projects for America’s largest 
cities, in part because of their very size, should be viewed as a potential, if 
qualified opportunity to augment the usual functions of CED.  Hence, I use a 
focused case study approach, analyzing the proposal, approval, and 
development processes of selected examples across the United States.  In 
doing so, each case analysis emphasizes the opportunities for CED and 
provides pertinent examples of successes or shortfalls in extracting 
concessions or other public benefits from private mega-developers, all while 
 
131.  See, e.g., J.K. Dineen, $260 Million Bailout in Works for Troubled Transit Center 
Project, S.F. CHRON. (Apr. 10, 2016), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/260-million-
bailout-in-works-for-troubled-7240115.php (describing San Francisco’s “investment” in the 
Salesforce-Transbay Center project as including hundreds of “good-paying construction jobs” with 
longer-term benefits for “the future of transportation in the San Francisco Bay Area”).Tanay 
Warerkar, Study: Hudson Yards Will Generate Billions in Revenue for NYC, CURBED N.Y. (May 2, 
2016), https://ny.curbed.com/2016/5/2/11565382/hudson-yards-generate-billions-nyc-economy-
jobs (noting the “creation of over 7,000 full-time jobs” for construction workers over the 
development timeline of the Hudson Yards mega-project on Manhattan’s west side, as well as an 
estimated 55,000 jobs filling the project’s “10.4 million rentable square feet of office space,” a “750-
seat public school,” and “over 100 shops and restaurants”); but see Steve Cuozzo, Swanky Hudson 
Yards Tower Secures Another Major Tenant, N.Y. POST (Aug. 22, 2016), https://nypost.com/2016/ 
08/22/swanky-hudson-yards-tower-secures-another-major-tenant/ (reporting, among other office 
lease announcements at Hudson Yards, the relocation of trading firm MarketAxess headquarters 
from Park Avenue to 55 Hudson Yards, adding to corporate relocations by KKR, Wells Fargo 
Securities, and Point72, suggesting corporate office relocations, rather than newly created jobs, 
comprise a significant portion of job creation estimates by Hudson Yards developer Related Co.).  
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paying particular attention to CBAs and their contents, where applicable.132 
Large-scale urban redevelopment projects typically bring concrete 
threats to extant lower-income communities, with “the potential to displace 
poorer residents, [to] cause overcrowding in local schools and create traffic 
congestion.”133  Even with sound review and permitting processes, local 
governments may face resident opposition, skepticism, and fears of 
deleterious community “character” changes.134  Controversy inevitably 
arrives with new project announcements and buildouts in many cities.  In San 
Francisco, large residential projects like NeMa (short for “New Market”) and 
The Jasper, both south of Market Street in the heart of the city, have drawn 
the scorn of locals for their sky-high rents (studios in each building begin at 
or above $3,000 per month) and sparked vigorous objections to their presence 
within the context of longstanding, lower-scale built environments of 
surrounding communities.135  These criticisms dovetail with sociological 
research that suggests housing costs as a prime, central correlate of 
dislocation and, in extremis, homelessness.136  Against the contrast of oft-
reported inadequacies plaguing homeless shelters and social services, as well 
as the criminalization of homelessness through anti-loitering ordinances and 
“harassment sweeps” of encampments, projects like NeMa have become 
towering symbols of market forces brushing up against the unmet needs of 
their surroundings.137  As such, these major projects—themselves not even 
“mega-projects” under the present working definition—heighten community 
tensions, suggesting greater risks of conflict as they scale up in size and as 
they primarily serve ever-higher income brackets, which they often do.138 
 
132.  See infra Parts III(C) & IV, passim.  
133.  Christine A. Fazio & Judith Wallace, Legal and Policy Issues Related to Community 
Benefits Agreements, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 543, 547–48 (2010). 
134.  Id.  
135.  Jay Barmann, Much Like the Nema, Apartments at the Jasper Are Wildly Expensive, 
SFIST (June 11, 2015), http://sfist.com/2015/06/11/much_like_the_nema_apartments_at_th.php; 
Katie Sweeney, SF: NEMA Brings Luxury Rentals to Mid-Market, HAUTE LIVING (July 25,  
2016), http://hauteliving.com/2016/07/sf-nema-brings-luxury-rentals-to-mid-market/618101/; THE 
JASPER, 45 LANSING DEVELOPMENT, LLC (2018), https://www.rentjasper.com/#.  
136.  Barrett Lee, Kimberly Tyler, & James Wright, The New Homelessness Revisited, 36 
ANNUAL REV. SOCIOLOGY 501, 509 (2010) (citing consistent and longstanding survey findings 
among homeless respondents in major cities, where cost of living increases lead many to housing 
insecurity or chronic homelessness).  
137.  See, e.g., Maria Foscarinis, Downward Spiral: Homelessness and Its Criminalization, 14 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1 (1996).  
138.  But see Marcia Rosen & Wendy Sullivan, From Urban Renewal and Displacement to 
Economic Inclusion: San Francisco Affordable Housing Policy 1978-2014, 25 STAN. L. & POL’Y 
REV. 121, 122–23 (2014) (arguing that San Francisco remains a “renowned nationally for its best 
practices in housing and community development,” despite these challenges, through funding and 
designating some 26,000 permanently affordable housing units between the 1970s and early 2010s, 
as well as approximately 170,000 market-rate family-oriented rental units with strict rent control 
restrictions).   
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Finally, observers consistently have noted that a range of economic and 
business variables tend to be pro-cyclical, meaning that higher spending 
moves in lockstep with a growing overall economy.  Government fiscal 
policies139 and research and development program spending140 sometimes are 
found to be pro-cyclical.  Labor productivity and manufacturing output in 
industrial-exporting states exhibit sector-specific cyclical behaviors in 
Chile.141  Consumption and individual investment decisions in the UK have 
been shown to follow pro-cyclical patterns.142  With particular salience 
following the Great Recession, borrowing and debt-financed investing 
among private businesses also tend to be pro-cyclical.143  Housing costs, 
along with housing development patterns among both public and private 
actors, tend to move in tandem with the business—economic cycle as well, 
with some areas devastated by broad volatility in localized economies.144  
Worryingly, recent research also has suggested that municipal budgetary 
decisions in times of severe economic distress become “more unpredictable,” 
as financial and personnel resources become strained and cities are forced to 
compete with neighboring jurisdictions for significant private investment.145 
 
139.  Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical? Working 
Paper (May 2005), http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.485.1225&rep= 
rep1&type=pdf; but see Carlos Vegh & Guillermo Vuletin, How Is Tax Policy Conducted Over the 
Business Cycle? AM. ECON. J: ECON. POL’Y 327 (2015) (arguing that industrialized states’ fiscal 
policies are countercyclical, whereas industrializing states’ policies are procyclical, while finding 
the same patterns vis-à-vis tax policies and economic cycles).  
140.  Gadi Barlevy, On the Cyclicality of Research and Development, 97 AM. ECON. REV. 
1131 (2007); accord Min Ouyang, On the Cyclicality of R&D, 93 REV. ECON. & STATS 542 (2011).  
141.  Lucas Navarro & Raimundo Soto, Procyclical Productivity in Manufacturing, 44 
CUADERNOS DE ECONOMIA 193 (2006).  
142.  Jagjit S. Chadha & Charles Nolan, A Long View of the UK Business Cycle, 182 NAT’L 
INSTITUTE ECON. REV. 72 (Oct. 2002).  
143.  Javier Bianchi, Overborrowing and Systemic Externalities in the Business Cycle, 101 
AM. ECON. REV. 3400 (2011).  
144.  Kenneth Gibb, Tony O’Sullivan, & Gillian Young, Analyzing the Belfast Housing 
Market: Learning Lessons from Extreme Volatility, 83 TOWN PLANNING REV. 407 (2012) (finding 
that the Belfast, Northern Ireland, housing market exhibited profoundly pro-cyclical price shifts 
during the run-up to the Great Recession, such that UK home prices between 2005 and 2007 
increased by “slightly less than [17%],” whereas the Northern Ireland market showed price increases 
of 95% over the same period).  
145.  Susan Opp, Jeffery L. Osgood Jr., & Cynthia Rugeley, City Limits in a Postrecessionary 
World: Explaining the Pursuit of Developmental Policies after the Great Recession, 46 STATE & 
LOCAL GOV’T REV. 236, 237 (2014); accord Karen Nelson, Municipal Choices During a 
Recession: Bounded Rationality and Innovation, 48 STATE & LOCAL GOV’T REV. 44S (2012).  But 
see CHRIS BENNER & MANUEL PASTOR, EQUITY, GROWTH, AND COMMUNITY: WHAT THE NATION 
CAN LEARN FROM AMERICA’S METRO AREAS 100–29 (2015) (noting increased efforts to 
“regionalize” development, thus mitigating inter-jurisdictional competition of the sort described by 
Opp and her coauthors); accord Mark Partridge & M. Rose Olfert, The Winners’ Choice: 
Sustainable Economic Strategies for Successful 21st-Century Regions, 33 APPLIED ECON. PERSP. 
& POL’Y 143 (2011) (affirming both actual trends toward and empirical needs for regional policy 
integration to avoid deleterious effects of inter-jurisdictional competition). 
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The evident pro-cyclicality of urban development and construction 
patterns in the United States highlights concerns from a CED perspective.  
While “mega-projects” exemplify the economic-business cycle,146 with 
project proposals and the scale of development investments generally moving 
in lockstep with the ups and downs of the overall economy,147 recent 
empirical evidence suggests the noted urban recoveries since the Great 
Recession have not favored existing low-income communities, from Skid 
Row in Los Angeles148 to the inner suburbs of established urban centers and 
the furthest, poorer exurban fringes.149  Official government statistics showed 
an aggregate increase in the poverty rate from 12.5 percent to 15 percent from 
2007 to 2011, despite massive increases in federal social services funding 
(approximately $500 billion) over the same period.150  Moreover, 
unemployment skewed heavily during and following the peak of the Great 
Recession, disproportionately affecting workers without college degrees, 
racial and ethnic minorities, and younger Americans generally during any 
period of the business-economic cycle.151  The “suburbanizing” of American 
poverty and its ongoing, generally upward trend over the preceding decade 
 
146.  See, e.g., Michael Comiskey & Pawan Madhogarhia, Unraveling the Financial Crisis of 
2008, 42 PS: POL. SCI. & POLITICS 271, 274 (2009) (focusing especially on risk factors for 
“speculative” developments and other “bubbles,” which follow pro-cyclical patterns as well); 
Giovanni Dell’Ariccia, Deniz Igan, & Luc Laeven, Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence 
from the Subprime Mortgage Market, 44 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 367 (2012); Yuliya 
Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 24 REV. FIN. 
STUDIES 1848 (2011).  For a broad, generalized discussion of real estate speculation throughout 
U.S. history, see Edward Glaeser, A Nation of Gamblers: Real Estate Speculation and American 
History, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1 (2013).  
147.  See supra Part III, passim. 
148.  Jordan Camp, Blues Geographies and the Security Turn: Interpreting the Housing Crisis 
in Los Angeles, 64 AM. Q. 653 (2012).  
149.  Elizabeth Kneebone, The Great Recession and Poverty in Metropolitan American, 
BROOKINGS INST. METRO. POL’Y PROGRAM (Oct. 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/ 
uploads/2016/06/1007_suburban_poverty_acs_kneebone.pdf.  
150.  Robert Moffitt, The Great Recession and the Social Safety Net, 650 ANNALS OF THE AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 143, 143–45 (Nov. 2013).  
151.  Sheldon Danziger, Introduction: Evaluating the Effects of the Great Recession, 650 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6, 7 (Nov. 2013); accord Lindsay Owens & Karen Cook, 
The Effects of Local Economic Conditions on Confidence in Key Institutions and Interpersonal 
Trust after the Great Recession, 650 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 274, 274–75 (Nov. 
2013) (finding not only geographic concentrations in foreclosure rates—namely, in the “Sunbelt,” 
e.g., Florida, California, Arizona, and Nevada—but also racial and ethnic concentrations of 
economic losses from the mortgage and foreclosure crisis, especially among African American and 
Latino homeowners); Brian Thiede & Shannon Monnat, The Great Recession and America’s 
Geography of Unemployment, 35 DEMOGRAPHIC RESEARCH 891 (2016); see also Daniel T. Lichter, 
Domenico Parisi, & Michael C. Taquino, The Geography of Exclusion: Race, Segregation, and 
Concentrated Poverty, 59 SOC. PROBLEMS 364 (2012) (finding overlapping, but generally 
heterogeneous patterns of increased hardship in terms of both class segregation and racial/ethnic 
segregation, across urban, suburban, and rural communities alike over the Great Recession).  
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accelerated markedly,152 as did the numbers of extremely low-income 
households vying for increasingly scarce public housing during and after the 
crisis.153  These declines in individual and household welfare are mirrored by 
declining inbound financial investment, often likewise concentrated in the 
same already struggling communities.  Though local bank branch closures 
from 2008 through 2016 were widely distributed, hitting both older Rustbelt 
cities like Detroit and the booming Sunbelt’s Las Vegas alike, urban areas 
generally account for 82% of all closed branches nationwide.154  The hardest-
hit areas notably include Baltimore County, where 25% of all bank branches 
closed during this period, and moreover, research pointed to the acute risks 
of “banking deserts” emerging in the rural American heartland as particularly 
alarming as well.155  These patterns have suggested deteriorating perceptions 
of trust in both public and private institutions, from the local to the global, in 
the hardest-hit American communities.  Accordingly, as much as “mega-
projects” afford opportunities to the CED movement, those opportunities 
may face exacting scrutiny and lingering distrust from those who might 
benefit from any extracted concessions given the at-best mixed records of 
private developers’ engagements with urban communities.   
 
 C. Lessons for Emerging and Proposed Projects: San Francisco, 
Salesforce, and Top-Down Urban Planning 
 
The mid-2000s saw the collapse of numerous, privately promulgated 
urban developments, from smaller markets like Norfolk, Virginia156 to the 
 
152.  Kneebone, supra note 149 at 1–3. 
153.  Michael C. Lens, Extremely Low-Income Households, Housing Affordability, and the 
Great Recession, URB. STUD. 1 (2017).  
154.  Owens & Cook supra note 151 at 275–76.  
155.  Bank Branch Closures from 2008-2016: Unequal Impact in America’s Heartland 1–2, 
10, NAT’L COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION (2017), https://ncrc.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
2017/05/NCRC_Branch_Deserts_Research_Memo_050517_2.pdf.  
156.  See Lydia Wheeler, With Granby Tower Well Behind Him, Buddy Gadams Refocuses on 
Apartment Market Downtown, VIRGINIA-PILOT (June 20, 2014), https://pilotonline.com/inside-
business/news/economic-development/article_89b78e8a-bd7b-5784-9573-78ce21c93997.html 
(discussing the post-recession rebound in the Norfolk, Virginia, housing market, after the collapse 
of funding and presales for a proposed $100 million, 34-floor condominium tower, which would 
have become tallest building in both the city and surrounding metro region).  
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largest markets157 and others in between.158  These foiled developments 
followed similar patterns during earlier cycles.  For example, there were 
volatile swings in urban development patterns during the early to mid-
1980s,159 but, new financing mechanisms, like Tax-Increment Financing 
(“TIF”) districts160 or increasingly popularized transit-oriented development 
(“TOD”) projects, which channel public funds or other subsidies into 
transportation-rich developments,161 distinguish these recent and ongoing 
 
157.  VORNADO TOWER – 15 PENN PLACE, EMPORIS (2018), https://www.emporis.com/ 
buildings/1182771/vornado-tower-new-york-city-ny-usa (noting the 1,450-foot tower planned just 
west of the Empire State Building was originally to finish in 2014, but fell through in 2013); but see 
Jessica Dailey, Vornado’s Hotel Penn-Killing 68-Story Tower Lives, Kind Of, CURBEDNY (Aug. 5, 
2014), https://ny.curbed.com/2014/8/5/10064394/vornados-hotel-penn-killing-68-story-tower-liv 
es-kind-of (discussing the implications of the project being “put on hold” amid preservationists’ 
concerns about the historic Penn Plaza district, notably including the Hotel Pennsylvania); Lois 
Weiss, Finance Firm in Talks Over Vornado’s Jumbo Skyscraper, N.Y. Post (May 9, 2017) 
(reporting a reworking of the original Pelli Clarke Pelli-designed tower, already approved by the 
city’s Planning Commission, as well as “interest” from Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and Deutshe 
Bank as potential financiers for a revived buildout).  The revolving door of key players in these pro-
cyclical projects—not only including Vornado, but also Related Companies and Skanska, as well 
as various architecture firms and investors—carries over across post-recession rebounds, especially 
in large cities with many such projects.  Id.  See also THE GIRASOLE, EMPORIS (2018), https:// 
www.emporis.com/buildings/251226/the-girasole-new-york-city-ny-usa (a 1,000-foot mixed-use 
tower proposed for completion in 2011, but cancelled during the economic downturn); 80 SOUTH 
STREET, EMPORIS (2018), https://www.emporis.com/buildings/205013/80-south-street-new-york-
city-ny-usa (a 1,000-foot, very low-density residential tower designed by famed architect Santiago 
Calatrava, cancelled before construction began, which would have “[held] only 12 residences” 
across its 56 floors and 12 “cubes” atop a commercial base); 52 WEST 57TH STREET, EMPORIS 
(2018), https://www.emporis.com/buildings/102103/52-west-57th-street-new-york-city-ny-usa (a 
24-floor, 365-foot residential tower scrapped after the market crash and onset of the Great 
Depression, which originally had been slated for completion in 1930).  
158.  Two massive developments would have provided Miami with its two-tallest towers, and 
several others among the tallest ten, including the twin Empire World Towers I and II, and the pair of 
towers of the Capital at Brickell; for the latter project, the North Tower would have topped at 809 feet, 
while the South Tower would reach 756 feet.  Both massive projects derailed after the start of the 
economic downturn in 2008, years short of the anticipated 2010 delivery.  See BUILDINGS IN MIAMI 
(UNBUILT), EMPORIS (2018), https://www.emporis.com/city/101321/miami-fl-usa/status/ unbuilt. 
159.  At least four skyscrapers—including two supertalls—were proposed and approved, but 
never completed, in Houston during the early to mid-1980s.  BUILDINGS IN HOUSTON (UNBUILT), 
EMPORIS (2018), https://www.emporis.com/city/101031/houston-tx-usa/status/unbuilt.  The tallest 
unbuilt building, the Bank of the Southwest Tower, would have reached 1,404 feet—the tallest U.S. 
skyscraper outside of New York and Chicago.  Unfortunately, the International Style, 21-story 
Southwest Tower was demolished before its much-taller replacement was put on hold and later 
cancelled altogether.  BANK OF THE SOUTHWEST TOWER, EMPORIS (2018), https://www.emporis. 
com/buildings/103046/bank-of-the-southwest-tower-houston-tx-usa. 
160.  See generally Jeffrey Chapman & Evgenia Gorina, Municipal Fiscal Stress and the Use 
of Tax Increment Financing (TIF), 83 TOWN PLANNING REV. 195 (2012). 
161.  See generally Justin Jacobson & Ann Forsyth, Seven American TODs: Good Practices 
for Urban Design in Transit-Oriented Development Projects, 1 J. TRANSPORT & LAND USE 51 
(2008); Richard D. Margerum, Susan Brody, Robert Parker, & Gail McEwen, Metropolitan Smart-
Growth Centers: An Assessment of Incentive Policies in Four Regions, 6 J. TRANSPORT & LAND 
USE 21 (2013).  
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projects from their predecessors.  Nonetheless, since the nadir of the financial 
crisis and recession, a new wave of proposed projects, including many which 
are heavily concentrated in New York, San Francisco, and similarly situated 
cities, follows these earlier boom-and-bust sequences in both style and form.  
They should encourage caution among observers and activists. 
San Francisco provides an illustrative example.  The City Planning 
Commission there has adopted an expressly TOD-favoring policy, evidenced 
by agreements involving the largest developments and in long-term planning 
approaches for neighborhoods with the greatest level of current and proposed 
activity.  The “Central SoMa Plan,” referring to a neighborhood roughly 
bounded between the Westfield Center, the Moscone Center, and the Caltrain 
lines southwest of AT&T Park, heavily emphasizes multi-modal 
transportation connectivity, improvement and enlargement of green spaces 
and other public amenities, all the while mitigating the “neighborhood 
challenges” of increasing rents, walking and cycling accessibility in the 
neighborhood, and land use inefficiencies.162  If completed as envisioned by 
2040, the Central SoMa neighborhood “is projected to [gain] 40,000 jobs and 
7,500 housing units,” as well as “over $2 billion in new infrastructure and 
other amenities.”163  In part, the Central SoMa Plan relies upon various “tiers” 
of “increased development capacity” depending upon existing building types 
within the defined area—extra allowances for retrofitted or new 
developments above current building height limits.164  These allowances are 
designed to move in sync with defined “public benefits packages” (e.g., 
public amenities, facilities, and services to be funded through developers who 
wish to build within the expanded permissions of the revised allowances).165  
Creating new affordable housing for the neighborhood is included among the 
“public benefits” envisioned, and highlighted extensively in the Central 
SoMa Plan’s organizing and research documents.166  Although omitted from 
Seifel’s analysis of the Plan, the original policy paper for affordable housing 
called for at least 33 percent of newly built housing “in areas [which] are 
rezoned” to be a mixture of “affordable-to-low-and-moderate-income 
households.”167  The Plan and its associated policies further require 
 
162.  CENTRAL SOMA PLAN, S.F. PLAN. DEP’T (2018), http://sf-planning.org/central-soma-
plan.  
163.  Seifel Consulting, Inc., Financial Analysis of San Francisco’s Central SoMa Plan 1 
(Dec. 2016), http://default.sfplanning.org/Citywide/Central_Corridor/Central_SoMa_Financial_ 
Analysis_FINAL.pdf.  
164.  Id. at 3.  
165.  Id. at 6.  
166.  Id. at 6–8; accord CENTRAL SOMA DRAFT POLICY DOCUMENT: AFFORDABLE HOUSING 
(“SOMA POLICY: AFFORDABLE HOUSING”), S.F. PLAN. DEP’T (Nov. 2014), http://default.sfplan 
ning.org/Citywide/Central_Corridor/Draft_CentralSoMa_AffordableHousingPolicy-November20 
14.pdf.  
167.  SOMA POLICY: AFFORDABLE HOUSING, supra note 171, at 2.  
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underscoring, maintaining, and growing the mixed-use/residential nature of 
land uses in the Central SoMa area,168 as does the adjacent Transbay 
development and Salesforce Tower, part of the “Transit Center District” 
which adjoins Central SoMa.169 
Despite these efforts and stated aims, the Central SoMa Plan and San 
Francisco’s general approach to development in the neighborhood have been 
challenged on various grounds.  Among other critiques, the Plan’s envisioned 
changes and land use restriction allowances might fuel high-end development 
and its concomitant displacement, rather than work to restrain it.170  In brief, 
the Plan ignores the “huge inversion” of the city’s demographics (namely, 
racial and class groups) from 2010 through 2015, a surge of higher-income 
white residents and simultaneous, historical “reversal and decline in low-
income people of color.”171  The South of Market neighborhood typifies these 
trends: the black population decreased over the same years while “a sharp 
increase in per-capita incomes” occurred throughout the area, with the 
eastern portions of SoMa seeing average annual per capita incomes rise from 
$88,000 to $114,000 over the same period.172  Furthermore, the outcomes 
illustrated by other, previous neighborhood Plans—such as the Downtown 
Plan, the Eastern Neighborhoods Plan, and the Western SoMa Community 
Plan—are decidedly mixed as well.173  If past is prescient, such Plans may 
“[achieve] the primary goals of adding new housing and office space,” but 
fail to “provide housing at various income levels” or “provide the 
infrastructure necessary to meet the . . . demands of new development.”174  
More acute failures concerning funding priorities and cost overruns—most 
notably the Central Subway extension, from the Transbay Center and 
Salesforce Tower north into the city’s Chinatown—have stirred considerable 
controversy as well.175  Irrespective of contractor failures or cost projection 
 
168.  CENTRAL SOMA DRAFT POLICY DOCUMENT: LARGE SITE LAND USE CONTROLS, S.F. 
PLAN. DEP’T (Feb. 2014), http://default.sfplanning.org/Citywide/Central_Corridor/Draft_Central 
SoMa_Large_Site_Land_Use_Policy-February2014.pdf.  
169.  Id. at 2.  
170.  David Woo, People, Land, and Profit in the South of Market: A Critical Analysis of the 
Central SoMa Plan (May 2017) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of San Francisco) (on file with 
the University of San Francisco Library repository).  
171.  Id. at 41.  
172.  Id.   
173.  Id. at 64–65.  
174.  Id. at 65.  
175.  Id. at 72; accord Michael Cabanatuan, SF Subway Stalled After Contractor Lays Down 
Wrong Track, City Says, S.F. CHRON. (May 10, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/bayarea/ 
article/SF-subway-stalled-after-contractor-lays-down-12905429.php (reporting that Tutor Perini, 
the contractor responsible for laying the new subway line’s tracks, “installed 3.2 miles of the wrong 
grade of rail,” which could add significantly to the project’s already over budget and behind 
schedule delivery; the project originally was slated for completion in December 2018, later pushed 
to 2019, for the nearly $1.6 billion extension).  
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mistakes, the rosy outlook of San Francisco’s planners belies the main thrust 
of the stated redevelopment strategy: prioritization of “building office space 
for technology companies” amid the latest tech sector boom and 
“constructing market-rate housing” as the predominant residential type.176  
Even maximum delivery of affordable housing under the current plans will 
be insufficient to halt the city’s, much less the region’s, affordability crisis, 
nor will expanding office spaces for high-tech and service-sector positions 
blunt the protracted effects of blue-collar job losses in formerly working-
class San Francisco neighborhoods.177 
The very use of comprehensive rezoning plans, like Central SoMa, tends 
to fuel speculative development, a phenomenon already apparent in areas 
adjacent to the Central SoMa Plan-defined district.178  These externalities 
should not be surprising given that the Plan, and much of San Francisco’s 
commercial market broadly, relies upon the technology sector, an industry 
which disproportionately hires workers from outside the Bay Area and whose 
workforce is “primarily white and male.”179  This top-down approach to 
planning agenda-setting can birth the mega-projects at the heart of this paper, 
providing the opportunities envisioned by local leaders and community 
groups, but the foregoing limitations should frame CED strategies, inform 
the process, and cabin the loftiest expectations. 
These are long-term lessons from San Francisco, a city described as 
“[having] arisen as an ‘instant city’ not once but three times.”180  Three 
boom–bust cycles of rapid development through the late 1990s, with an 
arguably ongoing fourth cycle, since the dot-com bust gave way to the 
modern iteration of the Bay Area’s exploding technology sector.181  In each 
of these cycles, San Francisco has struggled with the social costs and 
mounting displacement concerns associated with rapid urban development182 
and speculation-fueled investment.183  As the city works to execute the 
Central SoMa Plan, the Transbay Center redevelopment, and the increasingly 
 
176.  Woo, supra note 170, at 73.  
177.  Id. at 73–74.  
178.  Id. at 75–76.  
179.  Id. at 76–77.  
180.  Brian Godfrey, Urban Development and Redevelopment in San Francisco, 87 GEO. REV. 
309 (1997).  
181.  Id.  
182.  Nancy Raquel Mirabal, Geographies of Displacement: Latina/os, Oral History, and the 
Politics of Gentrification in San Francisco’s Mission District, 31 PUB. HISTORIAN 7 (2009); Rachel 
Weber, Selling City Futures: The Financialization of Urban Redevelopment Policy, 86 ECON. GEO. 
251 (2010) (rephrase: reviewing the globalization and “financialization” of US cities’ bond, 
corporate, and housing markets, as well as the mixed results for both TIF programs and overall 
commercial real estate markets).  
183.  Charles Himmelberg, Christopher Mayer, & Todd Sinai, Assessing High House Prices: 
Bubbles, Fundamentals, and Misperceptions, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 67 (2005).  
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scandal-plagued redevelopment of the Bayview Hunter’s Point 
neighborhood,184 these challenges are instructive, interrelated, and necessary 
to overcome for genuine partnerships with communities and their leaders to 
thrive. 
 
IV.  Mega-Projects: Cases, Controversies, and CBAs in New York: 
The Time-Warner Center, Hudson Yards, and Atlantic Yards 
 
The comprehensive development plans overviewed in Part III may 
suggest that private development—responsive to speculation, incentives, and 
concentrations of escalating cost of living—is unpromising for CED, but 
certain private projects and even mega-projects can offer a direct line from 
surrounding communities to the planners and designers.  Rather than wading 
into a city’s planning policy milieu, CED participants and leaders can, 
alternatively, engage directly with designers and builders from the earliest 
post-announcement stages, hoping to affect the direction and outcomes of 
enormous projects.  In this section, a series of brief case studies primarily 
drawn from New York City highlights the possibilities and pitfalls of this 
suggested alternative to the strictures of official redevelopment plans or to 
reliance upon CBAs alone.  At the same time, a recurring focus on the use of 
CBAs remains paramount; such agreements, it seems, remain pivotal drivers 
of positive development outcomes, work from the bottom-up more readily 
than alternative strategies, and help to solidify various stakeholders’ goals 
and commitments in binding fashion.  Despite opportunities for negotiated 
innovations in the following cases, the continued use of and elaboration on 
extant CBA models should not be discarded as vital components of CED 
strategy. 
 
A. Time-Warner Center and Columbus Circle Redevelopment: 
Powerful Patrons Collide with Local Demands 
 
The Time-Warner Center (TWC) at Columbus Circle in Midtown 
Manhattan characterizes both the possible opportunities for and drawbacks 
inherent in engaging with private mega-developers over CED concessions.185  
 
184.  The latest—and arguably unprecedented—is a scandal involving faked soil testing in the 
area amid the environmental cleanup of the former military–industrial site.  On May 1, 2018, local 
residents filed a class action lawsuit against Tetra Tech Inc., the environmental engineering firm 
accused of “faking” soil tests, “seeking $27 billion in damages” for the “mishandled cleanup,” 
fabrications of testing, and “exposing [residents and neighbors] to toxic materials.”  See, e.g., Emily 
Fancher, Bayview Residents Sue Engineering Giant over Alleged Fake Soil Testing at Hunters 
Point, S.F. BUS. TIMES (May 2, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/sanfrancisco/news/2018/05/ 
02/bayview-lawsuit-hunters-point-tetra-tech-ttk.html.  
185.  Justin Davidson, The Megamall-Hotel-Condo-Concert Hall That Ate New York City, 
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The project arose in the wake of 9/11, in a city still uncertain how to build or 
regulate its urban form with the specter of possible future attacks in mind.186  
The TWC also embraced the opportunity to redevelop and repurpose the 
long-neglected site of the Coliseum, a convocation center left vacant and 
unused since the mid-1980s, a monumental relic beside the similarly 
neglected Columbus Circle.187  Upon its opening in February 2004, the TWC 
was “the vindication of a [two-decade-long] $1.7 billion gamble,” following 
economic extremes, 9/11, and protracted negotiations among many 
stakeholders, as well as numerous earlier failed attempts to build out the 
property.188  The TWC is hardly an icon of progressive, egalitarian 
development itself.  Within its twin, 750-foot towers “rises a city [within the 
city] of $10,000-per-night hotel rooms, $325 dinner menus, and $125,000-a-
month rentals” or, more colorfully put, “a fat cat’s bazaar.”189  Given that, 
how on earth could the TWC offer lessons for or even be relevant to CED? 
The TWC inspired two interlinked trends in Manhattan real estate 
development in the years since 2004.  First, the TWC set a template for the 
design and scale of many projects to follow: large, tall, and glass, 
“embodying the glamour of high-rise Manhattan living.”190  Second, the 
TWC set a broadly recognized precedent that there is an expectation that 
comparably large projects in New York must provide cultural spaces and 
amenities to those who do not dine or vacation or live within the project’s 
walls, but who already live nearby.191  In doing so, the pejoratively labeled 
“neighborhood naysayers” who initially opposed the TWC can be said to 
have “learned to shape the development rather than just opposing it” 
wholesale.192  That learning curve, though, was steep – and the lessons for 
future developments and CED movement members’ attempts to “shape” later 
projects are more ambiguous.  
The first neighborhood concession during the TWC planning process 
was for the Lincoln Center, which was granted permission to expand its Jazz 
Center to a new, thousand-seat auditorium in the TWC complex.193  However, 
negotiations at the early stages were not concluded with a CBA, which had 
not yet been implemented in the United States, nor with any other binding, 
multi-party agreements.  As such, once construction of the twin-tower project 
 
N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 10, 2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/01/the-megamallhotelcondo 
concert-hall-that-ate-new-york-city.html.  
186.  Kevin Fox Gotham & Miriam Greenberg, From 9/11 to 8/29: Post-Disaster Recovery 
and Rebuilding in New York and New Orleans, 87 SOCIAL FORCES 1039 (2008). 
187.  Davidson, supra note 185. 
188.  Id.  
189.  Id.  
190.  Id.  
191.  Id. 
192.  Id. (emphasis added). 
193.  Id.  
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got underway in earnest, “the developer and the music-group arm fought over 
every detail.  [For the developer, the Related Co.], every square foot [given] 
away for free cut into [profit calculations and increased] risk.”194  Conversely, 
community stakeholders and the Lincoln Center especially bristled at the 
developer’s unfamiliarity with performance spaces, especially those which 
would need to accommodate a full range of productions, from young students 
to collegiate events to high-profile professional concerts.195  After years of 
false starts and contentious negotiations, the Jazz Center was delivered along 
with the TWC’s grand opening for a final cost of $131 million against initial 
estimates of just $40 million.196  Furthermore, the TWC failed to incorporate 
many locals’ demands from the earliest planning stages altogether.  No 
affordable housing or market-rate-capped units, no added green space, and a 
wholesale emphasis on the highest-end residents and clientele pervaded the 
completed project. 
Was the TWC a failure from a CED perspective?  Not a complete failure, 
perhaps, inasmuch as the project’s design succeeded in “knit[ting] together 
midtown and the Upper West Side” through “regridding” the former 
superblock, introducing new connections between the east and west facades 
of the building, and “rejuvenated” both Columbus Circle and the southwest 
portions of Central Park.197  From an urbanism and livability perspective, the 
TWC fulfilled some of its early mission to improve the vitality of the 
surrounding streets and to provide semi-public spaces to all New Yorkers and 
any visitors alike.  The TWC remains a cautionary tale on balance, and its 
successor project currently rises along the Hudson River’s abandoned 
industrial waterfront southwest of Columbus Circle: Hudson Yards, by the 






194.  Davidson, supra note 185. 
195.  Id.  
196.  Id.  
197.  Id.  For discussions of the ancient historical roots of street grid use in urban planning, 
see, e.g., Pamela Gaber, The History of History: Excavations at Idalion and the Changing History 
of a City-Kingdom, 71 NEAR EASTERN ARCHAEOLOGY 52, 61 (2008) (noting evidence of grid-
based street planning at Idalion, in modern-day Cyprus, evidently implemented upon Hellenistic 
colonization as early as ca. 300-100 B.C.E.); Nick Holder, Mapping the Roman Inscriptions of 
London, 38 BRITTANIA 13, 21 (2007) (describing Roman-era Londinium, the primogenitor of 
modern-day London, as having an “irregular grid” plan consistent with Roman city planning 
traditions ca. the first century B.C.E. and after); Martin Pitts & Dominic Perring, The Making of 
Britain’s First Urban Landscapes: The Case of Late Iron Age and Roman Essex, 37 BRITTANIA 
189, 191–92 (2006) (describing excavation sites at Silchester, southwest of London, as an “urban 
plantation” with typical Roman “planned street grid” organization, dating to ca. 25-15 B.C.E.).   
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B. Time-Warner and Hudson Yards: Unlearned Lessons 
 
The first major distinction between the TWC project and its successors 
is the introduction of CBAs.  CBAs emerged after the TWC in New York 
City, following the lead of the Staples Center in Los Angeles, signed in 
2001.198  CBAs thus became CED tools only after the TWC got off the 
ground, their use proliferating nationally only since the Staples Center’s CBA 
over fifteen years ago.199  Despite their availability and use nationwide, 
however, Hudson Yards did not incorporate a CBA into its planning and 
negotiating process, suggesting that Related, again the developer, may have 
abandoned ambitions for integrated, community-engaged development after 
challenges at the TWC.200  Hudson Yards is immense, with over 18 million 
square feet of new construction at a cost of $25 billion, “the country’s largest 
and probably most complex construction project” ongoing as of 2018.201  As 
the new mixed-use towers rise over the western edge of Manhattan, an 
enormous migration of financial services firms (KKR, Deutsche Bank, etc.) 
is set for coming years.202  The sheer scope and the high-profile clientele of 
Hudson Yards suggest a less than promising avenue for CED victories, 
especially in the absence of a CBA.  The project’s extent has seeped 
northward to the Lincoln Center and the Lincoln Tunnel, with closely 
adjacent towers being built all along the western edge of Lower Manhattan, 
an “almost unreckonable scale,” similarly raising alarms.203 
 
C.  Atlantic Yards and Embracing the Wisdom of CBAs 
 
The Atlantic Yards project (now renamed Pacific Park) sits atop the 
former Navy Yards location in Brooklyn.  Unlike the TWC and Hudson, 
Atlantic Yards is guided by a CBA, signed in 2005 as New York’s first and, 
to-date, largest governing a development project in the city.204  Atlantic Yards 
 
198.  The Role of Community Benefit Agreements in New York City’s Land Use Process 1–
2, NYC BAR (Mar. 8, 2010), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071844-TheRoleofCo 
mmunityBenefitAgreementsinNYCLandUseProcess.pdf.  
199.  Id. at 1.  
200.  Justin Davidson, Superhuman City: Hudson Yards, a Mega-Neighborhood Built from 
Scratch, Comes into View, N.Y. MAG. (Apr. 18, 2018), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/ 
04/superhuman-city-a-walk-through-hudson-yards.html (referring to the main Hudson Yards plaza 
as merely “nominally public,” while jabbing the Thomas Heatherwick-designed “basket of 
staircases” art installation as a “$200 million tchotchke”).  
201.  Id. (“Hudson Yards is the 21st century Rockefeller Center, but on an oppressive scale”). 
202.  Rob Urban, David M. Levitt, & Christopher Cannon, Wall Street Is Moving, and It’s 
Reshaping New York, BLOOMBERG (May 14, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2018-
manhattan-office-migrations/; see also supra note 135.   
203.  Davidson, supra note 200.  
204.  Dan Rosenblum, Selling Low, Building High: How Brooklyn Dropped the Ball on the 
Biggest Negotiation of Its Life, NEXT CITY (Feb. 18, 2013), https://nextcity.org/features/ 
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also includes extensive set-asides for affordable housing targeted to low-
income and middle-income families throughout Brooklyn, funding and 
training support for nonprofits to train or retrain community members, 
including Brooklyn United for Innovative Local Development (“BUILD”), 
and stabilizing a necessary mixture of commercial, communal, and other uses 
semi-permanently in rapidly crowding central Brooklyn.205  The surrounding 
areas of Brooklyn typify the types of communities most at-risk after the Great 
Recession and its stunted recovery.  They are rapidly gentrifying, shifting 
demographically, and becoming more impoverished, affecting those who 
were already most-vulnerable during the financial crisis.206  Hence, like the 
Central SoMa Plan and the Salesforce-Transbay development in San 
Francisco,207 Atlantic Yards presents the same counterproductive risks of 
accelerating rather than curtailing harms to extant residents. 
With the Staples Center in Los Angeles as a benchmark for CBAs, the 
Atlantic Yards CBA faces one common but pernicious challenge in the slow 
erosion of community organizational support since the CBA’s signing.208  
Even BUILD, the new nonprofit constituted by the project’s developers, 
folded in November 2012, resulting in a series of lawsuits filed by former 
apprentices who were discharged during their training programs.209  Local, 
urban, and community-focused Brooklyn media seized upon these and other 
failures as validation of initial trepidation, as well as entrenched distrust of 
former Mayor Michael Bloomberg, a major supporter of Atlantic Yards from 
its inception.210  In recent years, the systemic crisis of affordable housing 
shortages in New York have exacerbated these concerns: as of early 2017, 
Brooklyn’s demands for affordable housing included “more than 84,000 
applications for [the] 181 units at 461 Dean” and approximately 95,000 
applications for 535 Carlton, which has only 297 units.211 
Although BUILD collapsed quickly and litigation has plagued the 
intervening years of Atlantic Yards’ development, at least three community 
organization-signatories remain party to the CBA and several of its general 
outlines remain in force.  These include workforce and labor force 
requirements (e.g., minimum suggested requirements for minority and 
 
view/selling-low-building-high.  
205.  Rosenblum, supra note 204.  
206.  Id.; see generally discussion at Parts III(A) and (B). 
207.  See supra discussion at Part III(C).  
208.  Rosenblum, supra note 204.  
209.  Id.  
210.  See, e.g., Jess Wislonski, In Bruce We Trust: Mayor Bloomberg Says the Word of “Great 
Guy” Ratner Is Enough on Atlantic Yards ‘Community Benefits’ Agreement, BROOKLYN PAPER 
(July 9, 2005), https://www.brooklynpaper.com/stories/28/27/28_27nets1.html.  
211.  Norman Oder, The Real Math of an Affordable Housing Lottery: Huge Disconnect 
Between Need and Allotment, CITY LIMITS (Apr. 19, 2017), https://citylimits.org/2017/04/19/the-
real-math-of-an-affordable-housing-lottery-huge-disconnect-between-need-and-allotment/.  
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female workers at project construction sites and at subsequent full-time, post-
construction-phase jobs); similar requirements for contracting services; retail 
leasing set-asides for local businesses; ambitious 50 percent targets for 
stabilized and/or below-market-rate housing; and, finally, various public and 
community-focused amenities upon buildout, among others.212  Additionally, 
Atlantic Yards actually exceeded some of its initial plans for specific types 
of affordable housing, namely improved and enlarged family-sized 
apartments not initially included in designs.213  Even while the present de 
Blasio mayoral administration continues to “[target] a broad range of income 
bands” in New York affordable housing policy and “rent stabilization” for 
existing units, recent developments further encourage Atlantic Yards-styled 
mixed-income, market and below-market-rate construction.214  The red flags 
of a few years ago now offer some promising lessons for present and future 
successes. 
Atlantic Yards still receives considerable ire from its neighbors in 
Brooklyn and personifies locals’ distrust, but it appears much more 
successful from a CED perspective than similar mega-projects in the last few 
decades.  That qualified success should militate in favor of increasing the use 
of CBAs for projects of all shapes and sizes, though perhaps particularly 
mega-projects, since they are often the largest concentrations of financing, 
new temporary and permanent employment opportunities, and housing in 
strained markets.  CBAs have had a “mixed track record” since their 
inception with the Staples Center,215 but they are promising strategic avenues 
for CED leaders. 
 
D. CBAs and CED in the Context of Urban Development: Alternative 
and Mixed Strategies 
 
The lessons offered by the foregoing case analyses highlight the 
importance of creative, mixed strategies for the CED movement and its 
leaders.  That is, multiple approaches to promoting CED aims vis-à-vis 
private developments should be leveraged to maximize local benefits and 
protections for community members.  The TWC project’s shortfalls from a 
CED perspective, for example, may have been contained or offset by a CBA 
instituted from the outset of the project.216  Similarly, Atlantic Yards could 
have supplemented its CBA with targeted, informal pressure strategies used 
 
212.  NYC BAR, supra note 198, at 8–9.  
213.  Oder, supra note 211.  
214.  Id.  
215.  See, e.g., Oscar Perry Abello, What One L.A. Development Deal Says About the Future 
of Community Benefit Agreements, NEXT CITY (Dec. 24, 2015), https://nextcity.org/daily/ 
entry/benefits-of-community-benefit-agreements.  
216.  See supra Part IV(A). 
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by cultural institutions to exact (limited) concessions delivered by the TWC 
buildout.217  The confluence of different approaches linking governmental, 
private, and community stakeholders offers better opportunities for realizing 
the aims of CED while mitigating the externalities of high-profile, high-
budget mega-developments. 
Beyond the discrete strategies discussed below, perhaps the most 
important and intuitively simple strategy for CED leaders is to be mindful of 
and open to the full panoply of their strategic options.  No one “solution” 
exists, and no two projects or local community contexts are ever truly the 
“same,” suggesting no singular tool offers the key to success.  As such, while 
this paper emphasizes opportunities in CBA-based frameworks for CED, the 
novelty and recent emergence of CBAs must cabin evaluations of their 
projected outcomes.  These limits should also encourage further inquiry into 
how CBAs can be combined with longstanding legal, political, and social 
tools.  While the range of these tools is vast, three broad classes are of 
particular interest: direct developer-local government agreements, financial 
frameworks to deconcentrate investment and to offset the externalities of 
development through (e.g., tax-increment financing [TIF] and public-private 
partnerships [PPPs]), and related public housing-promoting arrangements in 
which private and governmental entities collaborate in all stages of 
development and post-buildout administration. 
 
i.   Development Agreements and Land Use Regulations 
 
Agreements between private developers and governmental entities, 
unlike the broader range of stakeholders in a CBA, typically do not include 
or contemplate the needs of constituencies who are not parties to the 
agreements.  Nonetheless, developer agreements (or development 
agreements) share much in common with the purposes of CBAs.  The 
fundamental “purpose of the development agreements . . . is to vest certain 
developmental rights in the landowner/developer in exchange for 
construction and dedication of public improvements.”218  Most often, these 
agreements are bilateral covenants between private and public parties in 
which the government authority agrees to abstain from using certain police 
powers (e.g., not applying later-in-time changes to zoning or land use 
regulations covering the development in question for some agreed duration) 
in exchange for the developer’s commitment to providing “public purpose” 
 
217.  See supra Part IV(C).  
218. BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT: A HANDBOOK ON DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS, 
ANNEXATION AGREEMENTS, LAND DEVELOPMENT CONDITIONS, VESTED RIGHTS, AND THE 
PROVISION OF PUBLIC FACILITIES 3–4 (David L. Callies, Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., & Julie A. 
Tappendorf eds. 2003).  
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or “general welfare” benefits offsetting the impacts of the project (e.g., 
establishing a fund for new classroom space in area schools, improved public 
infrastructure, public spaces, and other public goods).219  A related but 
distinct agreement type is the imposition of land development conditions on 
private developers in exchange for project approval, which similarly 
recognize the “variety of public facilities” required to “[support] 
development of any size and substance,” like roads, utilities, and schools.220  
Unlike development agreements, however, land development conditions are 
not bilateral exchanges, but instead are unilateral restrictions on land use and 
development defined and implemented by local authorities, such as city 
planning and zoning entities, acting on their own.221  Hence, land 
development conditions “invite judicial scrutiny” and must meet judicial 
standards under the Takings Clause and related doctrines.222  Among other 
factors, reviewing courts will consider whether the “so-called rational nexus” 
between the conditions placed on the development (e.g., exaction fees) and 
the extent to which the development in question is likely to produce outcomes 
which necessitate conditions or fees.223  Further, any “exaction” must “[bear] 
some rough proportionate relationship” to the need generated224 and whatever 
exactions are taken (most often direct fees) must “actually be used” for their 
stated purposes, rather than being directed into a general fund.225  Finally, 
whatever fees or exactions taken cannot sit idle (i.e., unspent) for long.226  
 
219.  BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 218, at 91–97.  
220.  Id. at 5. 
221.  Id. at 6. 
222.  Id.  The review standards applied when litigation challenges land development 
conditions are neither deferential to local governments nor are they models of clarity.  Accord U.S. 
CONST. amend. V (“private property [shall not] be taken for public use, without just 
compensation”); see generally, Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) 
(holding the refusal to permit Penn Central to build a skyscraper atop the landmark-designated 
Grand Central Terminal did not constitute an unconstitutional “taking” because the City’s refusal 
was specific to the proposal put forward by Penn Central, not a carte blanche bar on any construction 
above the site, and thus constituted a reasonable limit by the state which was related to a legitimate 
public interest goal); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (striking down 
a South Carolina law which barred new construction on the state’s barrier islands on grounds of 
mitigating erosion and environmental damage because the construction restriction effectively and 
entirely destroyed the value of owners’ lands); Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) 
(holding that the taking of private property through state powers of eminent domain for private 
development did not constitute an unconstitutional “taking” because the private development was 
geared toward public uses—namely, economic development—under the City of New London’s 
overall economic development plan, a legitimate public purpose).   
223.  BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 218, at 11. 
224.  That is, the exaction and the development’s impact must be reasonably proportional to 
one another, though jurisdictions have diverged considerably on what is “proportional,” id. 
225.  Id. at 11–12.  
226.  Id. at 13–15; see Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) 
(establishing and explaining the “essential nexus” framework generally); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
512 U.S. 374 (1994) (addressing regulatory/adjudicative takings through planning commission 
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Generally, though, exactions or conditions furthering affordable housing 
through these mechanisms have been successful in practice and upheld by 
courts.227 
 
ii. Tax-Increment Financing 
 
Developer agreements and land use conditions circumscribe the uses 
and functions of a development property, but tax-increment financing 
(“TIF”) offers “a method of financing the redevelopment of underperforming 
property by isolating the value added to the property from [the] proposed 
development (the increment) and taxing that increment only to pay for the 
redevelopment project.”228  In other words, TIF arrangements establish a 
“development incentive” using existing local property tax funds where a 
“portion of the property taxes raised by county, school and other local 
governments is given to cities . . . as reimbursement for development 
expenditures that have been made in specially designated TIF districts.”229  
Although variegated, the general functions of TIF and TIF districts are 
summarized as follows: 
The incentive for cities to undertake development projects using TIF is 
created by the generation and diversion (distribution) of tax increments 
among various local governments in an area.  Under TIF, a city designates a 
temporary TIF district in which development expenditures will be made and 
records the total property value in the district at the time of designation [i.e., 
the ‘base value’].  Then, for a limited number of years, the city makes 
expenditures for such activities as purchasing and clearing of land, street 
improvements, etc. which serve to increase the value of property within the 
district. 
The expenditures made by the city are reimbursed over time by the tax 
increment payments of the various governments having taxing authority over 
the property contained in the TIF district.  As property values in the TIF 
district increase above the base value, tax increments are generated by 
applying the general property tax rate for each government involved to the 
 
decisions and clarifying the two-step analysis and its application following Nollan).  For further 
discussion of acceptable grounds for development conditions vis-à-vis governmental 
comprehensive plans and planning consistency, see BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 
226 at 40–42; accord City of Irvine v. Irvine Citizens Against Overdevelopment, 25 Cal. App. 4th 
868 (1994) (affirming California’s highly deferential standard of review for “consistency” with 
municipal development plans, requiring only that the city or other local governmental entity’s 
regulation cannot possibly rationally be based upon furthering the aims of the plan).  
227.  See BARGAINING FOR DEVELOPMENT, supra note 218, at 67–71.  
228.  TAX INCREMENT FINANCING xxi (David L. Callies & W. Andrew Gowder, Jr. eds. 
2012). 
229.  Jack R. Huddleston, Intrametropolitan Financial Flows under Tax Increment Financing, 
19 POL’Y SCI. 143, 144 (1986).  
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growth in value (i.e., the “value increment”).230 
In theory, TIF arrangements offset city expenditures for promoting 
initial (re)development, usually meaning the city covers basic infrastructure 
and public amenities investments, including parking/garages, public streets, 
and sidewalks.231  TIFs operate through shifting tax revenues until “all 
development expenditures by the city [are] recovered,” after which the “TIF 
district is dissolved and the tax base within [it] is returned to full use” for any 
government entities with tax authority over the area.232  TIFs are common 
mechanisms for promoting and financing developments throughout the 
United States.  In Chicago alone, over 170 active TIF districts exist across 
the city, not including the broader Cook County, Illinois, or Greater Chicago 
metropolitan communities.233 
The elegant theory notwithstanding, TIFs have attracted widespread 
critical attention following the Great Recession.  In California, where TIFs 
were first implemented broadly, the state decided to scale back uses of TIF 
in recent years.234  Although metropolitan- and state-specific outcomes vary, 
recent studies have suggested TIF implementation was pro-cyclical leading 
up to and following the housing market crash just over a decade ago.235  TIFs’ 
pro-cyclicality makes intuitive sense: TIFs are future-facing, designed and 
implemented on the basis of future expected returns on development 
investments and future growth of property taxes accruing from the covered 
area.236  When the overall economy is growing, future expectations increase; 
when the overall economy corrects, much less when it crashes dramatically 
as in the Great Recession, future tax return projections follow suit.  The 
future-facing nature of TIFs thus can lead to inaccurate predictions and 
concomitantly misplaced investment choices.  Using Chicago as a leading 
example again, one post-recession survey of the city’s TIF practices found 
that while “billions of dollars in global capital” accrued to the city between 
1996 and 2007, the influx of investment became over-concentrated in 
commercial real estate properties237 and produced a sizable glut of office 
 
230.  Id. at 146. 
231. Huddleston, supra note 229, at 146. 
232.  Id.  
233.  TIF DISTRICT REDEVELOPMENT PLANS, CITY OF CHICAGO PLANNING & DEVELOPMENT 
(2018), https://www.cityofchicago.org/city/en/depts/dcd/supp_info/redevelop ment_plans.html.  
234.  See generally Robert T. Greenbaum & Jim Landers, The Tiff over TIF: A Review of the 
Literature Examining the Effectiveness of the Tax Increment Financing, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 655 (2014).  
235.  Richard F. Dye, David F. Merriman, & Katherine Goulde, Tax Increment Financing and 
the Great Recession, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 697 (2014); see also supra notes 143-149 and accompanying 
text.  
236.  See Greenbaum & Landers, supra note 234. 
237.  Rachel Weber, Selling City Futures: The FInancialization of Urban Redevelopment 
Policy, 86 ECON. GEO. 251 (2010).  
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spaces still searching for permanent tenants.238 
Beyond the pernicious risks of fueling pro-cyclical economic volatility, 
other theoretical and practical concerns regarding TIFs abound.  Typically, 
state laws “still require some evidence of blight” before TIFs can be 
implemented.239  The notion of “blight” in urban areas carries a racialized 
connotation from America’s earlier eras of slum clearing and so-called urban 
renewal projects from the 1940s through the 1970s.240  Recent econometric 
analyses have concluded the aggregate, city-wide, and decades-after effects of 
urban renewal policies were less unequivocally disastrous than some popular 
criticism suggests.241  At the same time, “blight,” as a term of art in urban 
politics in the last century, was an invented “disease” weaponized by renewal 
advocates without much more than a “vague, amorphous” meaning 
undergirding vast transfers of property and dislocations of entire 
communities.242  At a minimum, the problems of “blight” and of urban renewal 
were linked explicitly to “a class as well as a color” in practice,243 with 
marginalized minority communities disproportionately and often severely 
affected.244  TIFs or any other strategies employing a language of renewing and 
 
238.  Ely Razin, Why the Chicago Property Market Could Be a Good Deal, or a Risky Bet, 
FORBES (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/elyrazin/2017/11/09/why-the-chicago-prop 
erty-market-could-be-a-good-deal-or-a-risky-bet/#25e685b61314.  
239.  Greenbaum & Landers, supra note 234 at 658. 
240.  The twin policies of slum clearing and urban renewal were complex, driven by federal 
and local policy choices alike.  In fine, the Housing Act of 1949 provided legal authority and 
financial resources “aimed to revitalize American central cities,” often in conjunction with local 
powers of eminent domain enhanced by state government deference and delegation.  The effect of 
these actions and incentives was to allow local agencies to “assemble, clear, and then sell parcels of 
land in ‘blighted’ urban areas for redevelopment,” and by the time the original program ended in 
1974, “local authorities had been awarded federal support for more than 2,100 distinct renewal 
projects with grants totaling approximately $53 billion (in 2009 dollars).”  William J. Collins & 
Katharine L. Shester, Slum Clearance and Urban Renewal in the United States, 5 AM. ECON. J.: 
APP. ECON. 239 (2013).  
241.  Id.  
242.  See, e.g., Clement Lai, The Racial Triangulation of Space: The Case of Urban Renewal 
in San Francisco’s Fillmore District, 102 ANNALS ASS’N AM. GEOG. 151 (2012); Wendell E. 
Pritchett, The “Public Menace” of Blight: Urban Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 
21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 3 (2003).  
243.  Robert C. Weaver, Class, Race and Urban Renewal, 36 LAND ECON. 235 (1960).  
244.  See, e.g., John P. Elwood, Rethinking Government Participation in Urban Renewal: 
Neighborhood Revitalization in New Haven, 12 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 138, 179–80 (1994) 
(discussing “fine-grained” vis-à-vis “coarse-grained” redevelopment policy approaches in New 
Haven, Connecticut, through the early 1990s, with the latter’s exacerbating effects on commercial 
business displacement in so-called “blighted” communities highlighted in particular); Robert P. 
Kessler & Chester W. Hartman, The Illusion and the Reality of Urban Renewal: A Case Study of 
San Francisco’s Yerba Buena Center, 49 LAND ECON. 440 (1973) (noting the class-specific effects 
of displacement during the development of the Yerba Buena Center—now part of the Moscone 
Center convention complex South of Market in San Francisco—on “nearly 4,000 residents [who 
were] mainly low-income, elderly, white males living alone”); John A. Kirk, “A Study in Second 
Class Citizenship”: Race, Urban Development, and Little Rock’s Gillam Park, 1934–2004, 64 ARK. 
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rectifying “blight” likely will be viewed as inherently suspect.  The last 
century’s model of “urban renewal” was abandoned decades ago, yet it echoes 
in the ongoing, pervasively unequal milieu of urban redevelopment and 
runaway gentrification, often in regions where current progressive reputations 
collide with multi-generational traditions of institutionalized racism.245 
The terminology alone raises hackles, yet “blight” and “urban renewal” 
remain common fixtures of academic and legal writing on modern-day 
redevelopment, including in the context of TIFs.246  The challenges of 
implementing TIFs to achieve CED goals encompass much more than a 
branding problem, however.  The CED movement aims to support, develop, 
and empower local communities, fostering bottom-up agency and self-
determination.247  But TIFs implicitly and explicitly aim to drawn outside 
capital and investment into targeted communities, relying upon temporary, 
defined periods of tax incentives which end after a predetermined date.248  
Moreover, TIFs achieve their aims without providing the full panoply of 
public services needed in an area.249  It is unclear whether TIFs can be 
leveraged successfully in communities at either end of the economic 
spectrum, i.e., those which are booming or those which are stagnant, where 
the need for tax shifting incentives is either unnecessary or is (sometimes 
highly) unlikely to alter a community’s trajectory.  Though research on the 
intersections of CED and TIFs is growing,250 caution should underscore any 
 
HIST. Q. 262 (2005); George Lipsitz, The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: Racialized Social 
Democracy and the “White” Problem in American Studies, 47 AM. Q. 369, 373–76 (1995); Paul R. 
Mullins, Racializing the Commonplace Landscape: An Archaeology of Urban Renewal Along the 
Color Line, 38 WORLD ARCHAEOLOGY 60 (2006); Andrea Smith & Rachel Scarpato, The Language 
of “Blight” and Easton’s “Lebanese Town”: Understanding a Neighborhood’s Loss to Urban 
Renewal, 134 PENN. MAG. HIST. & BIOG. 127 (2010); accord Lucas-Darby, supra note 75 and 
Mirabal, supra note 169.  
245.  See, e.g., N.D.B. CONNOLLY, A WORLD MORE CONCRETE: REAL ESTATE AND THE 
REMAKING OF JIM CROW SOUTH FLORIDA (2014); Pam Kelley, Old Anger and a Lost 
Neighborhood in Charlotte, CITYLAB (Oct. 11, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/10/ 
old-anger-and-a-lost-neighborhood-in-charlotte/503627/; Niles Niemuth, Urban Renewal and the 
Development of Milwaukee’s African American Community: 1960–1980 (May 2014) (unpublished 
M.A. thesis, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee) (on file with the University of Wisconsin-
Milwaukee Digital Commons repository); Alana Semuels, The Racist History of Portland, the 
Whitest City in America, ATLANTIC (July 22, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/ 
archive/2016/07/racist-history-portland/492035/.  
246.  H. Lawrence Hoyt, What’s the “TIF” All About? 9, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING 
(David L. Callies & W. Andrew Gowder, Jr. eds. 2012). 
247.  See SIMON, supra notes 78-80.  
248.  Hoyt, supra note 246, at 19–20.  
249.  Id. 
250.  See, e.g., Matthew S. Gray & Cecily Barclay, California: TIF and Community 
Development Law 37 in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING (David L. Callies & W. Andrew Gowder, Jr. 
eds. 2012); George Lefcoe & Charles W. Swenson, Redevelopment in California: The Demise of 
TIF-Funded Redevelopment and Its Aftermath, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 719 (2014); Kenneth M. 
Murchison, Louisiana: From the Big Easy to the Suburbs, TIF and Its Dangers 95 in TAX 
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consideration of using TIFs for CED movement aims. 
 
iii. Public-Private Partnerships 
 
Finally, the use of public-private partnerships (PPPs) to produce 
affordable housing offers another strategic option for the CED movement.  
Although they have been used for decades, PPPs have gained increased 
attention in recent years as they incorporated various forms of subsidized/
public housing in exchange for tax incentives, “density bonuses,” and other 
government-provided perks.251  PPPs provide affordable housing most often 
through one of two general models.  The first major model is one in which 
the relevant private entity “develops, owns, and operates” the housing, but 
that portion project is financed publicly252 Usually, such affordable housing 
PPPs emerge after the public sector directly appeals to developers with plans 
for a project and announces subsidies for including income-restricted units 
(e.g., rental vouchers or tax credits).253  The second model is one in which the 
developer provides affordable housing units in exchange for broader—and 
often “more controversial”—forms of “favorable regulatory treatment,” such 
as “inclusionary zoning,” up-zoning, and other exemptions from building 
standards or usual project size limits.254  Once a PPP-based project with 
inclusive affordable housing is complete, however, different managerial and 
tenant participation outcomes emerge.  Overall, PPPs which use tax credit-
based approaches (e.g., those which allot credits to subsidize low-income 
tenants) rarely “involve residents in [any] significant, much less an 
ownership, capacity.”255  This disengagement of would-be residents from 
PPPs spans the lifecycle of such projects; from initial “involvement in the 
planning of a project” through “participation in its management” and the 
often nonexistent ability of residents to “obtain title to the property at the 
expiration of the tax credit” lifespan, residents often are shut out from most 
 
INCREMENT FINANCING (David L. Callies & W. Andrew Gowder, Jr. eds. 2012); compare W. 
Andrew Gowder, Jr., South Carolina: Using TIF to Restore a Community 153 in TAX INCREMENT 
FINANCING (David L. Callies & W. Andrew Gowder, Jr. eds. 2012) (providing a defense of TIF use 
in the North Charleston, South Carolina, development of Noisette and noting, inter alia, the 
transparent and community-involved process of developing it).  
251.  Tim Iglesias, Our Pluralist Housing Ethics and Public–Private Partnerships for 
Affordable Housing 11, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (Nestor 
M. Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy eds. 2009). 
252.  Nestor M. Davidson, The Value of Lawyering in Affordable Housing Transactions 35, 
37, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin 
Paul Malloy eds. 2009). 
253.  Id. at 38. 
254.  Id.  
255.  Michael Diamond, Another Model of Low Income Housing Tax Credit Development: 
Building Housing and Building Capacity 51, 56, in AFFORDABLE HOUSING AND PUBLIC–PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy eds. 2009). 
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of the fundamental workings of PPPs.256  The benefits of resident engagement 
and agency are intuitive—and well developed in research on public housing 
and PPPs257—but elusive under this particular developmental model.  
Particularly in communities with long histories of displacement, legacies of 
government-perpetrated dislocations under the guise of “renewal,” and 
modern challenges of hyper-competitive markets in resurgent major cities 
especially,258 disengagement from and lack of direct participation in PPPs 
can backfire, stoking backlash and community antipathy. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
The foregoing case analyses suggest a few generalized lessons for CED 
movement leaders, urban planning practitioners, city policymakers, and local 
residents alike.  First, non-CBA agreements in principle between developers 
and local organizers may lead to delivery of local community amenities or 
needs—like the Jazz Center at the TWC in New York, host to professional 
performances and local students’ groups alike.  Unfortunately, though, the 
TWC’s Jazz Center is not an easily emulated model.  For instance, the 
Lincoln Center and its jazz productions benefitted from powerful allies (i.e., 
former Mayor Rudy Giuliani) and enjoyed enormous brand name recognition 
advantages; the TWC also was conceived and delivered during an economic 
downturn in a part of the city which long lagged other development hotspots, 
like Midtown and parts of Lower Manhattan.  Second, and more instructive, 
is that the TWC’s developer, Related, veered away from such commitments 
in their larger, higher-impact encore project, the Hudson Yards 
redevelopment.  This suggests at least some limited risk that the failure to 
deliver negotiated, public-facing components of erstwhile private mega-
projects might diminish developers’ willingness to engage in the same 
processes and compromises again. 
Although a qualified success story, the drafting and negotiation of the 
Atlantic Yards CBA in Brooklyn helps frame lessons for practitioners’ 
strategies and further avenues for researchers.  The gaps in the Atlantic Yards 
CBA illustrate the importance of not only finding, but also retaining 
community partners and stakeholders well after the ink is dry. Additionally, 
Atlantic Yards shows the need for defining goals with greater precision (e.g., 
specifying types of jobs or training programs to be implemented) as well as 
demanding guarantees for certain continuity (e.g., through financing training-
 
256.  Diamond, supra note 255, at 56–62.  
257.  Id. at 62–65; accord Barbara Bezdek, Putting Community Equity in Community 
Development: Resident Equity Participation in Urban Redevelopment 93, in AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING AND PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS (Nestor M. Davidson & Robin Paul Malloy eds. 
2009). 
258.  Id. at 99–100.  
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focused nonprofits like the now-defunct BUILD).  Finally, all the projects 
discussed—and future mega-projects on the horizon—could learn from the 
successes of the Staples Center CBA.  There, building and maintaining the 
broadest practicable range of community group partners from the onset, 
involving them in the entire process, and binding all parties through a CBA 
remains the gold standard. 
CBAs are no panacea for urban challenges, particularly in the densest, 
most competitive urban markets.  But the structure and clarity they provide 
appear far superior guarantees than the informally and independently 
negotiated “extractions” achieved in the Time-Warner and Atlantic Yards 
cases.  Combinations of these and other approaches merit extensive further 
investigation and synthesis, especially as the size, cost, and complexity of 
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